

*Chapter 10***STRANGE FRUIT****The South African Truth Commission  
and the Demonic Economies of Violence***Allen Feldman*

At no other time more than in the present day has individual, social and institutional memory come under such concerted pressure, critique and exposure as a fragile foundation for truth and facticity. This current reluctance to authenticate social memory is intimately tied to well-known postmodernist depredations, which profoundly disenchanting the authority of tradition and authenticity, and emptied core institutionalised myths of their temporal and semantic continuity. As institutionalised memory fails to provide overarching master narratives that can win cultural consent, it has also become increasingly disjunctive with previously unnarratable history and experience. Consider the synchronic fictions of recent ethno-histories, the historians' debate in Germany on the facticity of the Holocaust, or even the critique of post-traumatic stress disorder and other recuperations of traumatic memory whose fictive psycho-medical legitimacy has been challenged by Alan Young and Ian Hacking.<sup>1</sup>

One perceptual effect of this disenchantment of temporal continuity, ideas of progress and authoritative historical presence is the flattening of the historical past, which now emerges as a synchronic series of orchestrated and mounted images, of made-to-order and ready-to-wear opportunistic icons – an endlessly refurbished collation of abbreviated texts and catchphrases. In late modernity, the line of historical depth-perspective has fractured, which is to say that a perspectival grasp or depth-vision of the historical eludes us or at best is comprehended as stylised and illusionary, as artificially bounded as the perspectival machinations of classical realist painting. Once the tendrils of linear historical time, ideally receding and converging onto a distant horizon of origin points, became undone, the ability of any recuperative social memory to travel this temporal ribbon to the counter-reality, the difference, the sheer intractability of the diachronic was disrupted, if not rendered downright circular.<sup>2</sup> If the advent of mass-produced photography undid the currency of realist painting, its perspectival artifice and narrative authority, what equivalent has

displaced linear recouable history, also dependent on the formula of perspective and linear access to a temporal origin point? We may ask: Is the historical, like the realist image, merely a mass-produced artefact of the market necessities of the present?

Yet in tandem with these ahistorical semantic environments, and in the wake of recent campaigns of political terror, there emerges the transnational project of anamnesis, known as the war crimes tribunal and the truth commission, which is devoted to social justice and redress by way of the dignity-restoring and truth-claiming efficacy of historical recuperation. There have been more than 20 such projects since the end of the Second World War, and more are being planned each year in response to the myriad of low-intensity wars against civilian populations, ethnocidal projects and counter-insurgency campaigns, and unreconciled and non-rehabilitated colonial and post-colonial injuries.

Is history an anachronistic indulgence that only the previously oppressed Third World and Eastern European nations alone can afford? Are these truth commissions merely a prelude before such geopolitically marginalised countries sink into the plush sofas of short-term memory characteristic of the developed nations and stable mass media democracies? Alternatively, do these 'truth' projects provide access to critical historical memory, to a much-needed critical relationship to historicity itself? Do they have a wider appeal that transcends the local agenda to rectify former murky wrongs?

Perhaps these agendas of redress and rectification are not so local in their ramification, and the restoration of civil dignity by way of memory is a much wider transnational need than we suspect. Part and parcel of the pathologisation that is imposed on countries struggling with the aftermath of oppression, political terror and violence is that this very struggle with a dark past only further confirms the geopolitical pathogenic character of these former political emergency zones from the perspective of outsiders. As a consequence, this pathogenic stigma serves to ghettoise many countries in democratic transitions, which are busy confronting their past, and, not surprisingly, absolves many other supposedly more stable and long-term democratic nations from facing history. There has been a certain frisson in the developed nations envisioning epochal issues in terms of the turn of the millennium, while South Africa, Chile, Guatemala, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda and Cambodia will have to confront the epochal turn in terms of what has passed for modern politics and state formation in the previous century. In pursuing their respective epochal enquiries, many of these post-violence societies are excavating much of the half-buried but still rotting and dimly comprehended geopolitical baggage that all nation-states have hauled with their respective political cultures into the present millennium. This contrast does not make the post-violent nation-states that are engaged in democratisation the historical or political unconscious of the 'West'; rather, it makes 'us' the unknowing bearers of their historical unconscious, for we still relegate to dream and fantasy the very historical material that these nation-states are awakening to with every passing day.

Critical memory, frequently allied with mourning, has become a symbolically powerful counterpoint both to the violence of anti-democratic regimes and other types of human rights violations, and to the incredible capacity of violent states and organisations to generate public forgetfulness and silence through fear, intimidation, communal trauma, disinformation and communicative distortion. Nation-building projects, reconciliation processes and movements for social justice have emerged energised by what can be called 'trauma-tropism'. 'Trauma-tropism' is a term I have borrowed and metaphorised from botany; in that science, it is defined as the reactive curvature of a plant or an organism resulting from a prior-inflicted wound. Single communities and entire societies can reorganise their identities, histories and projects around the curvature of chosen prior 'historical' wounding, and this would be a socially constructed trauma-tropism. Trauma-tropism is a form of collective memory; more specifically, it is a framework and methodology by which a collectivity recalls the past and places it in a dynamic and formative relationship to the interpretation of the present. Trauma-tropes are formations of memory that can cohere into formations of domination: institutional agendas, rules and prohibitions. Trauma-tropes are eventually prescriptive, even though they may initially indicate a point of historical stasis, a punctuation beyond which society cannot narrate itself. However, the stoppages and rupture incarnated in the trauma-trope can direct new narrative procedures, objects and solutions. And a set of ethical and governmental prerequisites have been institutionalised in the transnational discourse of human rights that organically links trauma-tropism to nomo-tropism, a curvature towards law, that is, the relocation of trauma, injury and pain from the individual and community to institutionalised memory, public culture, legal institutions and quasi-legal procedures of redress whereby persons and groups – 'victims of human rights violations' – are expected to overcome historical trauma through a repose in lawfulness.

Has the flattening of historical depth and the ambiguity of memory in part instigated a reactive recourse to trauma-tropism as a new vehicle for historical consciousness? In zones of present and former political emergency – such as South Africa and Northern Ireland, where I have conducted ethnographic research – there is an evident connection between the manipulative flattening, foreshortening and freezing of historical perspective and the turn to trauma-tropic practices, such as critical memory and truth commissions.<sup>3</sup> These political sites are characterised by the social production of memory out of violence on the one hand and, on the other, the state's concerted manipulation of the historical record and public memory of that violence as an instrument of counter-insurgency and of cultural hegemony. At these political sites, the orchestration of history is not solely part and parcel of the ambient perceptual immediacy and commodified media culture of late modernity or postmodernity, but a structural effect and strategy of chronic political terror and violence.

Apartheid-era South Africa was characterised by structural forgetfulness and the fragmentation of public recollection which was, and still is, an institutionally manipulated effect, emanating from: (1) the secret knowledge systems of

the state and from once-clandestine oppositional political organisations; (2) the apartheid culture of deniability that extended from the upper echelons of apartheid's ruling organs – government, armed forces, police services and intelligence services – to the everyday class, racial and geographic insularity of most white South Africans; (3) the ghettoisation of social knowledge imposed upon communities of colour by apartheid's geographical sequestration, a race-based inequitable education system, linguistic stratification, the cultural decimation of violently urbanised rural populations; and (4) media censorship and deliberate disinformation campaigns. These factors created a public culture of knowledge fragmentation and forgetfulness, which overlaid a dense mosaic of privatised memories and local knowledge, subversive oral culture and cults of secrecy in both white and black communities.

The effect of information stratification by race, class and locale, and by disinformation and censorship, is still evident today. The fragmentation of social knowledge, historical recollection and cultural memory cannot be underestimated in post-apartheid South Africa. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC's) mission and ethic of retrospective transparency by public institutions and political parties, of promoting a national session of confessional truth-telling, of opening secret archives and of institutionalising a culture in which victims give witness through its hearing process is a deliberate and ethically necessary attempt to address this legacy of fragmented social knowledge and memory. The transvaluation of the South African public sphere through disclosure, transparency and remembrance was considered to be a foundational stage of the state's democratisation and a core mission of The Truth Commission. The concealment of human rights violations and the sociological denial of the degree and depth of such violations were considered by the TRC to be as serious a moral offence as the actual acts of violence and atrocity themselves. The moral imperative of historical attentiveness, that is, the ethical responsibility to know and to be accountable for what is or can be known, underwrote the TRC's notion of truth and its project to interdict an institutional culture of deceit promulgated by the former apartheid state.

The following questions remain: What type of historical consciousness can be generated by a project to defragment historical knowledge, to redimension-alise historical experience through disclosure, confession, mourning and institutional redress? Through what methods will this defragmentation occur? Does this unification of historical knowledge and social cognition necessarily coincide with the unification of a polity as inferred by the concept and mandate of reconciliation? These are all issues in process in the contemporary public culture of South Africa, and the publication of the TRC's final report in October 1998 has not come close to resolving such conundrums.

In this essay, I shall discuss certain technologies of memory deployed by the TRC, particularly in its amnesty hearings. I will also show that mobilising memory is not only a vehicle for the recuperation of a violent past, but a technique, desire and performative achievement of the very political terror investigated by the TRC. Thus, social memory itself should be an object of contextualised human

rights enquiry. Any truth commission's acts of recall and recuperation must necessarily contend with how social memory functioned in the midst of the very human rights violations and atrocities that the commission excavates, and this focus is particularly apt for understanding the cultural linkage between the socio-economic or structural violence and the transacted or performed violence of the apartheid regime – two levels of political domination that the TRC was often accused of artificially separating. If South Africa is to come to terms with a terror-ridden past, then it must be through a knowledge of how certain memory formations contributed to the creation of that violent past. We need here a socio-cultural history of anamnesis, a critical 'memory of memory' in order to remember a future that moves beyond the pathogenesis of political terror and human rights abuse.

A multiplex history of an era of human rights violations will need to take account of social memory as cultural form in all its incarnations, anchoring, utilities and affect, for it is from this dense and intractable material that any project of social justice and reconciliation must unfold. Consequently, in this essay I turn to alternative trauma-tropes, the history of violent labour discipline, sorcery-related practices and beliefs, and perceptions of the demonic in order to explore what is left out of the machinery of anamnesis activated by the liberal-rationalist historiography of the TRC. The uncovering of multiple and positioned readings of the same events is the prime task of this essay. However, in presenting alternative readings, I make no claim that the local level or diachronic reading of events is inherently more totalising and exhaustive than the TRC's reading of these same events. All of these readings are positioned and necessarily incomplete in so far as their current lack of interface and dialogue in South African public culture still refracts the after-effects of the apartheid era's sociological fragmentation of public memory and knowledge.

Truth commissions, like any historiographic project, are mediated by the trinity of time, place and person, and are thus exercises in authoritative and hegemonic, yet partial and skewed, historical memory and forgetfulness. It is politically crucial that normative frameworks, narrative structures and forms of witnessing are dissected, discussed and interrogated at the level of public policy and scholarly enquiry. At the same time, truth commissions cannot be simply critiqued and dismissed from the idealised and fantasised perspective of a non-existent and unrealised panoptic history. Idealistically dismissing truth commissions for the sin of capturing only partial historical truths and narratives is ultimately the sociology of the obvious; at the very least, what is seen as incompleteness is but the prelude to analysis, and should not serve as a dismissal and closure. By placing the public memory generated by the TRC in conversation with alternative historiographies, my goal is not to achieve a totalising history, but rather to contribute to a still necessarily incomplete and partial multidimensional cultural history of human rights abuse in South Africa.

## Amnesty and the Ideology of Excuse

Due to its commitment to legal realism and the ad hoc therapeutics of 'the talking cure', what was the capacity of the TRC to approach the infliction and receipt of terror and violence as an organised continuum of meaning and identity, and not simply as a sequence of politically expedient or irrational or amoral acts that can be dismissed once publicised and condemned? Debates on these different interpretations were waged in public forums and associated with particular political parties and their respective strategies of remembrance and chosen historiography. Thus, the National Party and its supporters in the army and police depicted operatives of the state apparatus who perpetrated human rights violations as aberrant agents, whose stigmatisation would restore the integrity of the security forces while ensuring continued moral and political deniability for current opposition politicians and police and army upper command structures. Moreover, the psycho-theological tendencies of the TRC were used to reinforce such medicalising, psychologising and individualising interpretations of state-legitimised atrocities.

Amnesty hearings were the most controversial of the activities of the TRC. They were structured as modified adversarial adjudications in which the burden of proof rested with the applicant. The three criteria applicants had to meet were (1) full disclosure for the human rights violation for which indemnity was being requested; (2) demonstrated political motivation for the act; and (3) proportionality, that is, the moral ratio between the political goals and the violent methods used to realise those goals. The criteria of proportionality is potentially the most complex one to apply, as well as the most contentious. What measures can be applied to proportionality when it comes to acts of violence rationalised by arguments for a just war? In the context of amnesty hearings, the proportionality criteria could ideally foreground the irrationality of systemic institutionalised violence and recuperate the racialised socio-economic historical conditions that informed and patterned many of the atrocities committed by the state's security apparatus. However, the 'securocrats' of the former government were indemnified by demonstrating the first two criteria of full disclosure and political motivation. Where political motivation had been demonstrated in an amnesty application, no such application was denied for failing to meet the proportionality criteria. And although the killers of Steve Biko were characterised by the amnesty court as committing disproportionate violence, their amnesty application was officially denied on the grounds of failing to demonstrate 'political motivation' for their medical neglect of Biko. In effect, Biko's torture/interrogation was seen as politically motivated, but his post-torture medical neglect was not considered by the amnesty judges to be a political act. Can this division between the political and non-political be upheld, and can disproportionate or excessive violence be allowed to remain within the liminal conclusion 'lack of political motivation'?

One of the senior evidence leaders of the TRC's amnesty investigations had told me at the time of the Biko verdict that proportionality has been unofficially

dropped as a criteria for denying amnesty, especially when political motivation is demonstrated. He and other evidence leaders had attempted to demonstrate lack of proportionality in hearings, to no avail, and this was borne out by the granting of amnesty in cases in which political motivation was demonstrated but the proportionality of the violence deployed in relation to mandated political agendas was clearly not evident. Indemnification based on political motivation situates most political violence within existing ideological rationales and does not challenge formal justifications for the use of force – it sanctions the truth claims of instrumental rationality in regards to political terror. For example, members of the former regime's security forces frequently cite anti-communism as a justifying motive for human rights abuses against youths and children (who never heard of this ideology) and for the practice of torture. In cases in which political motivation is not demonstrated, a normative void frames the act of violence at issue.

For much of the South African media, for a significant portion of the white public and for representatives of the former apartheid state, excessive state violence does not originate in the state apparatus or in the historical culture of racism, but rather in the behavioural and moral pathology of individual perpetrators – 'bad apples', as former General Magnus Malan put it under questioning by the TRC in October 1997 in Cape Town. This perspective obscures any clear understanding of institutionalised racism, its inflection of the terror of the counter-insurgency campaign. Conversely, granting amnesty based on the applicant's anti-communism can hardly be seen as the 'stripping away of the lofty excuses' of apartheid, as one apologist for this approach put it to me.<sup>4</sup> In my view, the signifying of racist violence in coded terms such as 'lack of political motivation' merely aids and abets existing social denial syndromes concerning racism in the white community and defaces the structural contexts of racist norms in the South African public sphere.<sup>5</sup>

### ***Strange Fruit***

(sung by Billie Holiday, words and music by Lewis Allen)

Southern trees bear strange fruit  
 Blood on the leaves  
 Blood at the root  
 Black bodies swinging in the southern breeze  
 Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees  
 Pastoral scene of the gallow south  
 The bulging eyes and the twisted mouth  
 The scent of magnolia sweet and fresh  
 Then the sudden smell of burning flesh  
 Here is a fruit for the crows to pluck  
 for the rain to gather  
 for the wind to suck

for the sun to rot  
 for the tree to drop  
 Here is a strange and bitter crop

Amongst the numerous human rights violations and amnesty hearings dealt with by the TRC was the case of the Pebco Three. In this infamous incident of political 'elimination', three Black Civic Association activists were kidnapped by *askari* (double agents and informers), then beaten and executed by the police on 5 May 1985, near Cradock. One of the implicated policemen, Colonel Roelf Venter, described the scene of interrogation at an amnesty hearing held in October 1996:

[W]e went to Cradock where Major Winter, the commander of the Cradock security branch took us to the place where the three captives were. It was an old police station in the Cradock area. We had a barbecue and had some drinks and the three captives were with us but their faces were covered so they were not able to see us. I could see them, and it had not appeared [that] they were in any way harmed... I am not entirely sure what happened to these three ... persons nor did I hear afterwards what had happened to them.

The amnesty judge was fascinated with the positioning of the barbecue – or the *braai*, to give its local Afrikaans name – in the interrogation scenario.

*Judge Wilson:* I've heard several cases where when people are being questioned the police who were doing the questioning are enjoying a braai, was that happening here?

*Colonel Venter:* No. I did not interrogate them and I don't know whether they were being interrogated. They were in the vicinity but there was no interrogation conducted as we normally conducted interrogations.

*Judge Wilson:* When you say in the vicinity were they outside where you were having a braai?

*Colonel Venter:* Correct.

*Judge Wilson:* Can you give any reason why they should have been brought out there, why they weren't kept shut up?

*Col Venter:* No.

The Port Elizabeth paper *The City Press* of the 4 December 1994 does tell us what happened. It quotes a Sergeant X who made three statements regarding the Cradock incident. According to him, the Pebco Three were enticed by a telephone call to meet a British diplomat at the Port Elizabeth airport, and were driven straight to Cradock that very night by *askari*.<sup>6</sup> They were interrogated and assaulted with knobkerries (short, knobbed sticks) and pistol butts while the police held a barbecue, which was part of the scenario of the interrogation and not a postscript, as Venter claimed in order to remove himself from the scene of torture. Subsequently, the three activists were executed, their bodies burnt and the remains dumped in a river.

Anti-apartheid activists who had heard stories of interrogations or had undergone interrogations themselves understood the police *braai* as a code for assault and murder, as in the following case from Port Elizabeth in 1985.<sup>7</sup>

*Mr Mpompi Melford Dlokolo:* I could hear some cars driving in, these people (the police) had come to see this person and when Gerber came, he said 'So this is the Mpompi', then another foreigner from Port Elizabeth came -. He came and there were three whites with me and they were saying they were going to have a braai and I knew they were referring to me.... There is a farm not far from Humansdorp - as you go down there are also some bushes and then we go round those bushes and Faleni said I should go and collect wood. I said 'No, I am not going to'.

*Rev. Xundu:* Is Faleni the only person who you knew?

*Mr Dlokolo:* Yes, Faleni was the only black amongst whites. One of these white policemen was from Port Elizabeth. These were the two people who were torturing me. Faleni was asked to accompany me to go and collect wood so that they could make a braai, because we were heading for Uitenhage. Then I refused, I said there is grass, there is no wood. I didn't even plead, I just refused, so they made their braai next to the Kombi, then I had my thing, I was holding it fast and I was sure they were not going to do anything to me. So, we went to the police station, that is I was going to take an oath, before Kayamier who could see - Kayamier was a Judge in Humansdorp and they could see that I was bleeding.

The consumption and culinary imagery of the barbecue appears in the following testimony of T. Mvudle, given about his police interrogation in 1985 at Khut-song, where he was a leading member of the local youth/student organisation.<sup>8</sup>

At about one in the afternoon they called me. They said I seem to know a lot and I have been organising a lot. They requested information about the children who would go to Botswana and Zambia.... They took a shambok from the van.... They took our shirts off and then started assaulting us with shamboks. We kept on denying, saying we do not know. At about three they put a fire on. They had a braai. They would take us one by one. There was a forest nearby where they would take us. After coming back from the forest you just would not be able to talk. I would ask the others what happened. They would say no, we have been really beaten up at the forest.

At about four they took a group from amongst us. Four of us were left behind. The boys (his fellow captives) were braaiing meat. (the police) were saying they do not know what they are going to do about me because I had put them in trouble. Van Wyk was drinking brandy the whole time. He said that they are all the same. They took the fork that they used for the meat, and came to me. I was half-naked. He put it on my back. This mark is as a result of that assault. They burnt me. They said that I would tell the truth....

On other occasions, the police use the *braai* to humanise their relationship with their captives and insulate their own conscience from the violence, and as a cover-up strategy for recent acts of brutality, as evidenced in the amnesty hearings of the notorious torturer Jeffrey Benzien, here speaking to his victim:<sup>9</sup>

*Mr Benzien:* Could you remember the time that you had seen snow for the first time? Can you remember what happened in the snow? The husband and the wife and the two children who were taking photos of you playing in the snow

along the N1? Your trip to Colesberg, where you braaiied with me that night and with the rest of the Unit, therefore Mr Forbes, in the spirit of honesty and reconciliation, I am sure you are making a mistake about the 16th of every month [being] the day that I would assault you....

*Mr Forbes:* I would just like to say that these are all occurrences that I can clearly remember. But then to continue could I then ask Mr Benzien, apart from I think the impression that you are giving this Commission is that we went on these joy trips in the snow and for braais and so forth, can I put it to you that it was always after an assault of this nature, that we would be taken on these trips and that the intention of these trips was to ensure that the injuries would heal and that I would actually not get into contact with the District Surgeon?

Most of these acts of police cover-up took the form of burning the bodies of victims, in order to conceal both the acts themselves and the identities of the deceased. Charity Kondile, speaking on the kidnapping and execution of her son Sizwe, centres on the culinary aura of the disposal of her son's body.

Well, Dirk Coetzee goes on further to say that when he died, they put his body on a pile of wood with a tyre near the Komatiepoort River at night, where it took them nine hours to burn his body. Dirk Coetzee further states that twice they were burning his body, the flesh was smelling good and they were having beers at that time. So it was like a braai to them. As a mother I feel that, no matter whether it was politics, fighting for his land, I don't think he deserved all that treatment. I feel it was grossly inhuman. I feel they could have killed him and gave us the body or left it in the veld there, I feel that this was tantamount to cannibalism, or even Satanism.<sup>10</sup>

In July 1996, at an amnesty hearing in Pretoria, investigators of the Fidelity Guards security firm and former policemen Hennie Gerber and Johan van Eyck petitioned for amnesty. The applicants claimed that they (along with co-investigator Frans Oosthuizen) had been in part acting on behalf of the National Party when they murdered suspected Pan-Africanist Congress member Samuel Kganakga on 21 May 1991. They had been investigating the robbery of R60,000 supposedly committed on behalf of the Azanian People's Liberation Army.<sup>11</sup> Advocates acting for the amnesty applicants told the TRC that Gerber's and Van Eyck's actions had been politically motivated and thus met the Commission's requirements for amnesty. The amnesty applicants regarded themselves as agents of the police against what was at the time seen as a communist-inspired onslaught against the state.<sup>12</sup>

Gerber, one of the amnesty applicants, described the abduction of the victim and the locale of the murder: 'He was ... taken by vehicle to this open field, I decided to go to Cleveland forest area where we usually had braais.' Their captive was bound and hoisted up by his legs so that he was hanging upside down. This was at about 9.00 a.m. Nkoana, an African employee of Fidelity Guards, witnessed the interrogation.

Mr Gerber ... came with a bag with some extra ropes in (it) also, it seemed like old telephone (wire). And then he instructed the deceased to sit down, tied his legs with a rope and used a piece of stone as the tree was very high, you know, to tie that stone to the rope and then throw it over the blue gum tree. They did that. They started hoisting the deceased upside down on that tree, and then after that they tied the rope on the tree. And they further untied his belt and ... they pulled his trousers up and took out this torturing machine (electric shock apparatus)<sup>13</sup> ... and started (connected) one wire on his finger and then the other piece of wire on his private parts.

Kganakga was questioned while the electricity was applied to his genitals. He continued to deny all knowledge of the robbery that he was suspected to have played a part in. Nkoana continued: 'I could see that the deceased was crying and starting jerking while hanging upside down and he was crying very badly. And while he was doing that, it seems they were enjoying the thing because they were laughing.'

After the application of the shocks, which lasted for about an hour, Kganakga was left hanging upside down on the tree for most of the day until about 5.00 p.m. He was lowered from time to time for more shock treatment but then hoisted back onto the tree. Nkoana was never told to ask Kganakga about his political affiliations. Later, Nkoana was sent by Gerber to buy 'cool drinks': '[T]hey said to me I must go to the shop to buy some cool drinks, because it seems maybe they have had enough (of torturing). They have been trying to get the information from Samuel, but all the time he was denying.'

When he returned, Gerber and van Eyk had retired to their vehicles about 200 metres from the tree. They were drinking whisky and vodka. Gerber explained the drinking of alcohol as follows: 'During these types of investigations and interrogations alcohol is always used. No right-thinking person can act in this way without your conscience plaguing you.' However, Gerber never made any reference to the laughing, the joking and the interrogators' connoisseur-like perusal of their handiwork that accompanied the torture and the alcohol consumption, which imbued the occasion with a recreational atmosphere.

Every now and then they returned to where Kganakga was hanging to continue the torture and questioning. During the course of the day, while Kganakga was hanging suspended from a tree, Van Eyck collected leaves that were lying in the vicinity and set a fire under the captive's head. It was his evidence that the intention was not to cause any injury to Kganakga but to further intimidate him by causing him to breathe in the smoke.

At 5.00 p.m. Nkoana was told he could go. Kganakga was lowered and brought back to the vehicles by the torturers. His face was swollen, his eyes were bloody and red; he could hardly walk, and he had marks and abrasions on his legs. Gerber then claimed that despite having hung upside down for most of the day, and in spite of his swollen legs and multiple abrasions, Kganakga was able to jump up, charge Johan van Eyck and grab him. 'That was when I

realised that we had big problems', Gerber testified. As their captive ran in the direction of the mines, Kganakga was allegedly shot and killed while attempting to escape. It was decided to get rid of the body, and Gerber took the corpse to a deserted spot where he poured petrol over it and burnt it. Later, Gerber took the body and chopped off one arm, which had not been burnt, to prevent identification of the body. After the disposal of Kganakga's remains, the security guard put it about that one 'terrorist' had been killed during the course of the robbery. Nkoana reported for work the next day. He stated: 'On arrival at the office, the first person I met ... was Frans Oosthuizen. He then said in Afrikaans, "Moenie worry nie, ons het hom gebraai" [Don't worry, we have braaiied him]'. Thus, the disfigurement of Kganakga accompanied his categorical transformation and abstraction from an individual and co-worker of his torturers into a charred specimen of a fictive 'terrorist'.

*Braai* is Afrikaans and South African English for an outdoor barbecue, and *braaiing* is a ubiquitous weekend recreational practice throughout South Africa. Associated with sports competitions, hunting, the frontier geography of the bush, relaxation and alcohol consumption, it is also part of the political culture of white male dominance. *Braaivleis* is the name for the meat that is consumed at such events. It is my contention that at the *braai* and torture sites described above, consumption, commensality and violence were integrated, and that this synthesis seems to have become a convention – to the extent that one cannot immediately discern from Gerber's testimony of past *braais* held at the Cleveland Forest spot whether he refers to actual barbecues, to interrogations and torture, or to both.

This association of *braaiing* with torture and interrogation speaks to issues that have concerned theorists of torture and political terror since Arendt's meditation on Nazi banality. I refer to the incorporation of everyday life practices, objects and associations into extraordinary scenes of violence and terror, a dynamic which serves to normalise the violence for the perpetrators and which conversely refracts the increasing penetration of a culture of terror into the quotidian. At Kganakga's *braai* torture and those of others, consumption and commensality serve to normalise excessive brutality and to inure the perpetrators from the human consequences of their acts. Distancing and depersonalisation of the victims began with the hooding of the captive, the erasure of a face, of individual identity. Kganakga's disfigurement is further enhanced by inversion, by hanging him upside down, and this is elaborated by successive acts of disfiguring violence.

Torture has been universally described by its practitioners with the culinary imagery of 'softening' the suspects so that they will want to relinquish their information. Kganakga's body, for instance, was subjected to an elaborate and baroque series of culinary-type procedures that had little to do with the extraction of information: he was hung upside down like a piece of meat; he was 'softened' by electric shock attacks; he was smoked and cooked by fire; he was dismembered and butchered – his body transformed into leftover refuse. In the meantime, the laughing perpetrators consumed 'cool drinks' and alcohol.

These atrocities transformed Samuel Kganakga into an object of food consumption and recreation. Nkoana, one of two black witnesses, was obviously not part of this commensality. He misinterpreted the call for alcohol as the termination of torture and as a sign of the ex-policemen's frustration with their captive's denials; however, drinking was necessary to intensify the commensality of the violence. Gerber may have told the TRC that he drank due to a bad conscience, but it would not have advanced his amnesty application to advertise that he drank as a form of recreation and pleasure during torture. However, the inducement of anesthesia by alcohol, as claimed by Gerber, supports my point that the consumption practices and commensal dynamics of the torture served to inure the perpetrators from the consequences of their acts, from the pain they were causing. I would suggest that this physiological anesthesia is a component of a wider socio-cultural anesthesia which informed the racial treatment of Kganakga and which was manifested by the transmutation of the prisoner into something bestial – an artefact of consumption – and a racialised specimen and political commodity.

With regards to Kganakga's culinary dehumanisation, it is clear that the defacement of his personhood proceeded through a process of animalisation. Animalisation transforms the racial Other into prey, and in this instance communicates with the economic and food consumption metaphors of the *braai* that further deface – and by inference politically commodify – the victim's body. In Kganakga's case, the electric shock treatment, the hooding and hanging like a haunch of meat, and the attempt to burn the victim's head are techniques of racist cuisine, of changing the raw into the cooked, the individual into a specimen, Kganakga the security guard into a fictive terrorist and a political artefact that could be circulated as a triumph within the culture of securocrats.

In the TRC archives there are dozens of transcripts from the state security forces in which the act of *braaiing* features as commensal and recreational activity, as the site for casual police social gatherings, as a predominately male space, as a way of passing the time during the evenings in cross-border operations in the bush, and as a celebration of the completion of successful counter-insurgency operations. In reported incidents of human rights violations, the *braai* also appears in the midst of interrogation episodes entangled with the scene of torture, as an apparatus of torture and as a tool for covering up the tracks of torture and murder through the burning of bodies. These disposal fires are almost always termed *braais* or compared to a *braai* in TRC hearing testimony. The victims are always black; white anti-apartheid activists were the recipients of other forms of torture. Anti-apartheid activists who had heard stories of interrogations or had undergone interrogations themselves understood the police *braai* as a code for assault and murder. Being taken to a *braai* by the police meant that a black detainee would be severely ill-treated and possibly executed.

## The Political Economy of Violence

It is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination, but on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political instrument.... [T]he body becomes a useful force only if it is both a subjected body and a productive body.<sup>14</sup>

In reference to consumption and commensality, anthropology has always attended to *how* societies fashion the substances that sustain them, and here I want to apply that perspective to bodies of colour as a sustaining substance of the political terror and of the political economy of the apartheid regime. Consumption, food and commodification metaphors, as repositories of deep cultural memory, served to materially fashion acts of state and neo-state violence in South Africa. I would propose that there is a mnemonic linkage of the *braai* tortures described above with prior forms of labour coercion and the economic commodification and consumption of bodies of colour. This linkage can be discerned at three levels: (1) the relationship of the forms of torture applied to Kganakga and other victims of *braai* interrogations to the forms of labour discipline violence that ensured the continued commodification and compliance of black labour in southern Africa from the seventeenth century to the 1980s; (2) the depersonalisation and bestialisation of the victim's persona into an artefact of consumption – *braaivleiss* – through culinary deformation and analogous forms of bestialisation in labour discipline practices in the agricultural and mining industries; and (3) the evocation of labour subordination performances in the *braai* tortures. I would further suggest that the *braai* tortures were theatres that mobilised antecedent forms of racialised interpersonal dominance and structural subjugation that could not be practically sustained in the 1970s to 1980s in an increasingly insurrectionary South Africa, and as such constitute acts of structural nostalgia. Thus, these interrogations, tortures, murders and body disposals, irrespective of their practical political goals and content, legitimised excessive disproportionate violence that sustained and fed the perpetrators of these atrocities at multiple levels of act, memory and meaning. These atrocities were re-enactments, material forms of anamnesis for the assailants that had only the most tenuous connection to anti-communist political or military strategies.

Here we must reflect on the process by which the racial Other, coercively deployed as an instrument of economic production, is eventually transformed into a medium of pleasurable consumption, a process that links violence and the commodification of black labour with consumption/commensal practices that elaborate white dominance within the economic culture of South Africa prior to and during apartheid, and during the counter-insurgency campaign of the 1970s to early 1990s. I stress the pleasures, fantasy material and satisfactions produced by the chosen substance in these tortures, and in doing so seek to remedy the TRC inability's to address disproportionate and racist violence in amnesty hearings. And I will do so by deploying historical and ethnographic materials that speak to

a diversity of cultural memories linked to such violence that had no status with the TRC. Here one must point out that in South Africa, racism is historically not solely a psychological pathology but also an instrument of economic organisation and subjugation, crucial to the creation and disciplining of a labour force.

Both the violence applied to Kganakga's body and the locale of the torture harbour dense historical associations and genealogies that, I propose, are crucial to understanding the political economy of the body that is both refracted and re-enacted by such torture practices in South Africa during the 1970s and early 1990s. The methodology of torture and the ill-treatment of the body of victims in *braai* tortures and post-execution disposals access an economic memory, a culture of labour discipline, rituals of racial and class relatedness acted out on the terrain of the abused body of colour that are entwined with the cultural memories of white economic hegemony, an economy that was facing a growing political crisis in the 1970s and 1980s when state-enacted *braai* tortures emerged and became routine. The cultural fault line of this crisis, though aggravated by international sanctions and boycott, was situated in popular resistance, clandestine community organising and community-based insurrection that, from the perspective of a racist political economy, could only be viewed as a massive race- and class-based breakdown of labour discipline throughout South African society. Both in customary form and motivation, the *braai* tortures are archaeologically linked with the practices of labour discipline in colonial, post-colonial and apartheid-era South Africa. In turn, such evocations of labour discipline in practices of political torture can be viewed as mutually fashioning the embodiment, social identity and class position of both the aggressors and the victims.

It has been long established that societies do not leap from one economic mode and means of production to another; the latter are structurally related, not least by common ideological apparatuses such as labour discipline. I look to the means of production in three overlapping South African economic epochs to show the continuity and evolution of labour discipline ideologies and practices, tracking these practices as they eventually migrate to counter-insurgency practice. As evocative as it may be, I do not claim that the replication of labour discipline ideology and practices is symbolically expressive of the entire history of racist oppression in South Africa; no such totalisation is asserted here. I do make the link between the *braai* tortures and the discrete history of labour discipline, which does display a certain teleological profile as domination methods shift to and from different economic modes and relations of production that are pertinent here: (1) a slaveholding economy, (2) agrarian tenant/sharecropping and white agrarian paternalism, and (3) industrial relations of production in the mineral industry. However, the migration of labour discipline practices to the field of counter-insurgency is not a teleological culmination of economic hegemony, but rather something contingent. The translation of labour discipline frameworks from economic domains to political-policing domains indicates that ideologies and structures of economic teleology and hegemony were in crisis in the period of *braai* tortures.

In the Cape Colony, at least one slave per month was publicly executed between 1680 and 1795. A full array of whippings, beatings and punitive amputations was mandated by law. One method of capital punishment was for the offending slave to be crucified hanging upside down from a tree, much in the same way Kganakga was suspended from the gum tree. The bodies of executed slaves were frequently left out in the bush to be devoured by carrion eaters. Slaves convicted of arson, a standard form of slave resistance and insurrection in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were punished by being 'half-strangled and killed' on a 'slow' fire.<sup>15</sup>

The symbiosis between labour commodification and violence that was institutionalised with slavery in the Cape Colony in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was greatly expanded in terms of population and geographical scope following the emancipation of the slaves in the 1830s and the military annexation of trans-Ciskean territories in the 1840s and 1850s. It was finalised with the 1913 Land Act – that rapid and violent mass production of a rural proletariat composed of African tenant farmers who had staged an economic recovery in the latter half of the nineteenth century.<sup>16</sup>

Informal 'cajoling' and violent coercion of African labour resources under independent chiefly control was, from the eighteenth to the mid nineteenth centuries, transformed into a coercive ideology of rural paternalism and a policing grid rooted in the compound system of the mineral industries. The right to corporeally discipline the underclass of colour had been vigorously defended by slaveholders in the Western Cape since the eighteenth century, when colonial governments had attempted to place half-hearted limits on these practices that were reasserted as part of the coercion of labour in the supposedly free labour market of post-emancipation South Africa. In the second third of the nineteenth century, white landowners, represented by such organisations as the Zuid-Afrikaansche Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging (BBV), promoted an ethic of farm-labor discipline based on patriarchal familial metaphors, a rural labour paternalism that was a key repressive apparatus enforcing class and racial distinctions. By the late nineteenth century, the white homestead, with its underclass of tenant and seasonal contract labourers, was seen as the ideological wellspring for the ethics of 'working, obeying and submitting' that organised racial interaction and class relatedness within disciplinary frameworks. This rural paternalism and its command of violence were advanced as a model in miniature for the South African nation-state as a whole.<sup>17</sup>

As the Comaroffs have extensively discussed, these views were part of a wider ensemble of 'moralised discourses' that posited the issue of African labour disciplining within policing, geographic, theological and medical frameworks. Nevertheless, brute violence existed alongside these ideological apparatuses in the enforcement of labour discipline, particularly in agricultural areas marked by labour scarcity. Rural paternalism was literal; white farmers looked upon and disciplined workers of colour as children, confining them to a world of domesticated subjugation. In the nineteenth century, the Natal Masters and Servants Act (1850) authorised the confinement and dietary punishment of

offending farm labourers, and provided a legal framework for a customary law of beatings and floggings that were meted out to black contract labour.<sup>18</sup> The 1932 Native Service Contract Act, section 11, mandated the whipping of offending workers.<sup>19</sup> Based on the results of a study conducted between 1979 and 1981, the South African Council of Churches concluded that torture and other forms of violent disciplining of farm labourers was widespread. The study found a high incidence of workers being beaten naked, having their clothes cut from them before an assault, and having their sexual organs wounded; the Council urged the banning of sjamboks, a kind of whip. In 1986 the Association of Rural Advancement reported that the flogging of workers was considered a 'paternalistic rite' in rural Natal.<sup>20</sup>

The choice of an abandoned mine site as the locale for the interrogation of Kganakga can also be viewed as evoking an economic geography in a South Africa deeply entangled with the processes of violent labour discipline, proletarianisation and class formation. From the late nineteenth century onwards, the mines, with their heavily policed compounds, were essentially run as closed institutions. Further, the induction or initiation of black workers into mine labour resembled many of the more recent intimidation and sensory deprivation techniques used by the apartheid security apparatus in their treatment of political detainees. Mine training focused on coercive conditioning and the initiation of the black worker's body and mind to underground environments. The newly recruited workers were confined to heated, windowless 'acclimatisation chambers', where they received little or no food and water, and were compelled to do physical exercises.<sup>21</sup> Anti-apartheid activists describe being subjected to analogous sensory deprivation regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, involving position abuse, compulsory exercise, and food and sensory deprivation. The mine compounds in southern Africa were militarised sites patrolled by security officers who were recruited from ethnic groups different from those of the labourers. Boss boys, white miners and compound police frequently assaulted black labourers, resulting in large-scale desertions from the mines. In certain mines, recalcitrant workers were placed in cells equipped with 'stocks' and flogged. According to Van Onselen, the whippings were so vicious that it took more than one man to administer them.<sup>22</sup>

And as in the *braai* torture episodes, much of this violence was ideologically advanced through methods of depersonalisation and bestialisation. Ideologies of race-based bestialisation were crucial to the commodification of black labour. On the farms, contract black labourers were given the names of cattle or of wild beasts, such as Bobbejaan (baboon); farm holdings were referred to as being stocked with natives which had to be 'broken in'.<sup>23</sup> Mine workers were perceived by white managers as 'imported stock' that had to be acclimatised to the mines; instead of personal names, workers were known simply by their numbers. The Comaroffs state that the coercive commodification of the black population proceeded through animalistic imagery such as the trope 'beasts of burden'.

The selection of the bush as the locale for the interrogation of Kganakga can also be viewed as evoking a crucial stratigraphy in South African economic violence

and labour discipline. Historically, the forced removal of individuals and communities of colour to the bush signified their subhuman and animalised status; the bush was where the bodies of recalcitrant slaves were disposed. The imagery of the bush is made up of contradictory and antagonistic cognitive maps. For Bantu cultures, the bush is positioned by traditional inside/outside polarities such as village/bush, the social/the wild. It is a liminal space for the ritual initiation of male youths and for traditional healers; the animals associated with the bush are symbolic mediators for the human world. However, the bush also resonates with the colonial history of the Xhosa and other African populations being pushed off of fertile lands to infertile margins by the British and Afrikaners. In Cape Town, coloured working class memory interprets the forced relocation of coloured populations from city centres and nearby suburbs – such as District 6 and Mowbray in the 1960s to the remote Cape Flats – as tantamount to forced exile to the bush and as sealing their animalisation in the state's eyes. The bush was further elaborated as a geography of dehumanisation in the 1970s and 1980s, when it became the scene of clandestine state violence involving interrogation, torture and execution sites such as those described in the testimony cited above; this was a covert political geography that harboured remote execution farms that became the site of grisly forensic exhumations by the TRC. Police and army personnel operating in bush settings for long periods during operations such as cross-border raids referred to the state of being 'bush-fucked', a colloquial term for continued exposure to traumatic violence.

The performative infrastructure and semiotics of *braai* torture and the realisation of punitive violence detailed above suggest that these episodes were ritualised re-enactments of racialised class relatedness mediated through the terrain of the black male body. The state's *braai* violence transcribed labour discipline codes onto the political template of the insurrectionary and insubordinate male body of colour. And this wholesale transfer of a symbolic economy of class and racial dominance/relatedness occurred when a once triumphant political economy was being challenged by 'labour' insubordination of previously unimaginable scope. In some *braai* tortures, the collapse of the mandated socio-economic and geographical discipline of apartheid was performatively encoded in customary forms of violent labour discipline. In other interrogations this was combined with overt rituals of labour service and structural nostalgia in which the prisoners prepared the *braai* that would later be used for their own torture. The disposal fires rendered many an aftermath of torture and execution into a scenario of commensality and celebration in which the victims were consumed at multiple symbolic levels. The imagined communist onslaught, with its explicit anti-capitalist associations, was the dream form through which the rupture in apartheid's symbolic economy was imagined and projected onto black bodies by the securocrats. It is now all the more curious – if not downright offensive to any human rights paradigm – that this fantasy served as the basis of indemnification in amnesty hearings.

The crime that Kganakga was accused of fit well into this fantasy material. Kganakga had been the black subordinate to Gerber and Van Eyck in their place

of employment. The bank robbery attributed to him was a fantasised assault on South African capitalism in the form of violated labour discipline and expropriation of white wealth by clandestine agents of colour. Kganakga was assumed to be a member of the Pan-Africanist Congress, though he was never asked about it at any time during his torture. After his death, he was fictionalised as an unknown terrorist.

The construction of racial and class relatedness through labour discipline is apparent in the conjuncture of subjugated labour, the command of violence and consumption/commensality practice in the following account from Jabu James Malinga, speaking of his torture near Alexandra in 1978, which resembles the labour scenario of Dlokolo's torture described above.<sup>24</sup> In Malinga's testimony, the use of the term *kaffir* and the rehearsal of labour subservience serve to set both the scene of intimidation and the racial and class relatedness between the white policemen and their victim, all of which seem important to the policemen's interrogation protocol. The fact that, as in the Kganakga torture, policemen of colour either assist at or watch these atrocities further accentuates the dramaturgy of domination. We have here the doubled colonial optic of the bestialised black body, fit for punishment, labour and burning, and the quasi-humanised black body wearing the endowed uniform, i.e. the discipline of its masters. Thus, the divide between bestiality and subhumanity is a labile one for people of colour in the *braai* theatre.

And Mtibi and Skieter and ... Van der Linde (policemen), they were in a green Chevrolet. They called me, they said I must get into the car. I wanted to know why. They said, you kaffir, you mustn't ask a lot. Get in. Then I went inside the car and left off with them. They took me into some bush in Alexandra where it is a highway at the moment. They took some meat from the car, they said I must just go and get some wood for them. I did as I was told. And then they said I must make fire for them. Thereafter they said I must braai the meat for them as well. And thereafter they were eating and drinking alcohol.... Then they started beating me. They said I knew too much, they will show me something that I don't know. They handcuffed me and the fire was still burning at that time. They took me towards the fire, they threatened to burn me should I not be prepared to talk the truth. I didn't think that they would burn me or not. Whilst they were assaulting me and the other one lifted my leg they dragged me towards this fire. They started burning me, they said I must talk the truth. I refused because I knew that should I tell the truth they will kill all my companions. Then they burnt me. I was dressed in an overall. When they realised that I was burning they took something to extinguish the fire. They extinguished the fire. They said they wanted to know what we were doing on the 17th June. They wanted the truth. I still refused to tell them. I was just being kicked, I was not aware of what was happening, I was unconscious at that moment. I found myself at the clinic. That is when I became conscious. I can't remember what happened.

The rhetorical search for the truth by the torturers indicates that another type of truth than that of political secrets was being extracted from the abuse

of Malinga's body. It is a truth that is not so much encased in what is said or silenced in an interrogation, but a truth and a discourse that was articulated in the methodologies and sequencing of acts of degradation and intimidation that moved Malinga and his interrogators through a series of stylised role sets organised by the iconography of forced labour, consumption and personal nullification.

In the aggression inflicted upon Samuel Kganakga, Jabu James Malinga, Melford Mpompi Dlokolo and other victims of *braai* tortures, the symbolic economy of performative violence and the violence of historically inscribed economic domination can be seen as integral to each other's ideological replication in consciousness and enactment. *Braai* tortures were a theatre of economic replay and nostalgia for old structural hierarchies that could be replicated in the present state of emergency only through the sensory associations of the masculinist and white barbecue. The *braai* torture was a pleasure-inducing experience in which the subordination of racial Others was explicitly linked to heightened moments of commensality, object-choice, and virtual or symbolic cannibalism.

The convergence of forced labour, violence and consumption practices also coincides with almost pan-African anti-colonial perceptions about European capitalist penetration and forced labour practices. This is particularly true for black labour in the mines, who view economic violence as a vast machinery for the consumption, cannibalisation, digestion and wastage of bodies of colour, a folk perception that coincides with west and southern African witchcraft-related beliefs concerning 'belly-eaters and soul-eaters'. The *braai* torture episodes give us a glimpse of this process from the other side of economic violence, that of the white *baas* (boss) and consumer of black subordination. We are dealing here with trauma-tropes, racial images and wounds that provoke commensal pleasures on the one hand, and acts of domination and violence that are encrypted by consumption symbols on the other hand, thereby indicating the presence of commodification logics at the core of both repressive and ideological apparatuses. It is precisely the capacity of *braai* tortures to evoke and replicate old hierarchies that enabled the perpetrators to extract power, pleasure and identity from these atrocities, essences that had little to do with the gathering of political intelligence but much to do with political, racial and class identity.

However, despite my focus on economic culture, this is not a traditional Marxist analysis, for there are other readings that intersect with the diachronic one I have just provided, and these readings directly address the excessiveness and disproportionality of the violence, its very lack of political utility, expediency and rationality. These facets must be attended to, for even contextual socio-economic explanations can overrationalise modalities of being and perception that begin on the historical stage of state political and economic instrumentality and terminate in an altogether different place, and that alternative site has been marked by the religious and medicinal beliefs of the communities from which the victims of *braai* torture came.

## The Door of the Demonic

As a mother I feel that, no matter whether it was politics, fighting for his land, I don't think he deserved all that treatment. I feel it was grossly inhuman. I feel they could have killed him and gave us the body or left it in the veld there, I feel that this was tantamount to cannibalism, or even Satanism.

Charity Kondile, a Xhosa from Port Elizabeth and a member of the Zionist Church, whose testimony is mentioned above, had declared that the torture, execution and *braaiing* of her son Sizwe was a form of cannibalism and Satanism. It would be easy to dismiss her accusation of Satanism and the demonic as the expression of an understandably distraught mother. However, I have since discovered that the notion of the demonic reflects another, quite crucial cultural memory at play in the comprehension of state terror, this time from the perspective of South Africans of colour. I was recently sitting in the Cape Town office of a 'coloured' policeman seconded to the Amnesty Committee of the TRC.<sup>25</sup> He has been involved in numerous torture investigations, including *braai* tortures. A meticulous and methodical investigator and evidence analyst, and the right-hand man of the TRC's legal experts, he is also a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. He told me the following:

Sometimes when I read the amnesty applications, it really gets to me [that] it cuts me right to the bone, sometimes when I've read an application over a hundred times I still can't believe that men or humans can have been so evil going in and killing families, mothers, children, to me it was because they were just demonic, it is only a person who is controlled by demonic powers or forces who would do these evil deeds. Its evil! And I just hope and pray that they would find peace within themselves when they come and speak about this (at amnesty hearings).

I asked him what was the origin of the demonic.

I come from a police background it has been institutionalized that the police would braai every Friday, because of my religious background and my beliefs, I would not attend for at a braai they would discuss the women they slept with, the guys they assaulted. If you look at guys like de Kock, Coetzee, and other guys who braaied people, in normal human understanding you can never understand what would bring someone to do something like that, it's not the culture or the upbringing [-] it has to be some force or some demonic power because you are burning this person, while less than 20 metres from him, while this flesh is burning, you are actually having your meat, it's a Satanic ritual, you are offering this person to Satan, here is the trophy. If you look at it from [a] religious aspect it is actually some form of Satanism, 'you have given us this power (being above the law, being judge jury and executioner), so we are giving you back the sacrifice', it makes them feel powerful. By doing this they get that sense of power. If you look at it from a religious point it comes from Satan itself. They would never use those terms, but without realizing it they are coming

under the lordship of Satan himself because they are being controlled because of the evil deeds that they are doing.

Are they are extracting a sense of power from the act of sacrifice? I asked.

Naturally, yes, because if you do it once you will do it again. Blowing up one person into a 1,000 pieces, as one amnesty applicant put it, and the day after holding a braai and laughing about it, once doing that, they get that sense of power no matter who you are. It will take you up. And that power is demonic. It's not from God, for these men went to church, and they ... never confessed the wrong they've done. Later on it becomes a normality, something they were just doing. They could argue the facts, but I could sit down with them and prove it to them, that they are totally under the control of the demonic forces. I would prove to them in a biblical sense and in a non-biblical sense. In the non-biblical sense, if you go to [a] certain place, certain places are under the stronghold of Satan because of the things that is happening there. If you go to Indonesia where they have a lot of witchcraft and a lot of rituals, they have voodoo, they have ouiji boards, these are all demonic powers. You that are living there are being controlled by demonic forces, that is from a non-biblical sense (non Christian). If you read the amnesty applications when they go to do torture they always go back to these certain spots, for instance a mine, a shooting range, because they feel safe there because no-one could see them. They realize this is really where we can exercise our powers. They open a door at that point because that place accumulates power, because sometimes when I step into a torture spot, I could feel its presence. I wasn't afraid, it even challenges me in my dreams, but I overcome it with the blood of Jesus.

I am still exploring how widespread these beliefs are, but the ethnic, religious and geographical differences between Mrs Kondile, a Xhosa from the Eastern Cape, and this Seventh-day Adventist policeman, of coloured or mixed race from the Western Cape, suggest an undercurrent of folk theorising on what the TRC would call disproportionate human rights violence. Like Charity Kondile, this TRC functionary, a former member of the same police force he is now investigating, sees the demonic in these acts of torture, a demonic that fashions power through ritualised violence, an act which is not simply the application of state power to the victim. The demonic is centred on the requirement and substance of the victim; it is not repressive violence that deletes or eliminates, it is a productive force akin to the apartheid economy. Like that economy, it is tied to a circuit of miasmic spaces which attract, magnetise and accumulate such acts of violence. The notion of the demonic speaks to embedded concepts of morbidity, of chronic evil, of sickness, possibly of possession and consequently of healing and redemption. We are in a religious and medically discursive territory here, but one that is far removed from the individualised confessional canons and talking cure of the TRC.

In order to explore the fuzzy terrain of the demonic and of moral sickness and healing, I turned to *Umntu Omhlophe*, the 'white people' popularly known by the

Zulu term *isangomas*, carrying my case files of atrocities to male and female traditional healers from KTC and Crossroads shanty towns where I was conducting community-based fieldwork. I was interested in the notion of miasmatic space that can attract further acts of violence as discussed by the policeman and as inferred by Mrs Kondile. Xhosa *isangomas* by trade are intimate with such spots, which are usually associated with roads, especially crossroads where fatal highway accidents have occurred, and particularly with mine shafts, where industrial accidents and deaths have taken place. There are sites where 'a lot of people have lost their souls', I was told. The recurrent phrase was that these were magnetic spots that 'pulled', 'dragged' or 'invited' souls – *ukutsala imiphfumlo*, in Xhosa. *Umphefumlo* is a soul (the prefix *imi-* indicates the plural form), and *phfumla*, the verb form, means 'to breathe'. *Phfumla* has a moral connotation, for to breathe is also to speak of painful events that weigh on someone; it can also mean the strong, empowered speech of the traditional healer. A person in mourning or a person harbouring great suffering and emotional trauma experiences a heavy weight on the chest and shoulders, and cannot breathe easily.

These miasmatic spots are places where the spirit leaves the person, as indicated by the many souls lost at these locales. In such a miasmatic spot, one is no longer *umphefumlo*, that is, with a soul; once the soul is gone, one can no longer breathe, for what made one breathe is absent. At this juncture, the souls that are 'dragged' from the person are transformed into *imimoya imibi*, troubled, restless spirits that gravitate to the miasmatic site. *Kwelemimoya* (spirit-place) is a term used to describe the locations of dragged spirits. Since 'bad' untimely death is frequent in the mines, it is customary amongst the miners to commission *isangomas* to go down into the mines every six months to talk to the spirits at a spot where someone has died. Cows and goats are slaughtered, and white beads and tobacco are left, as this propitiation ensures a renewed level of safety for the miners. Roads where car accidents have been frequent receive the same ceremonial attention.

I held extensive discussions with the *Umntu Omhlophe* (the 'white people') about what was occurring psychologically, physiologically and metaphysically in the *braai* tortures. In these discussions, the term used for the victim was *ixhoba*, which can mean prey or target. To *braai* is *ukosa*, or *ukoja*. In their diagnoses, the *isangomas* focused on the exposure of the torturers to the aroma of burning human fat, a substance that is used by a few healers in their treatments, though most utilise animal fat. According to the healers, the aroma and smoke of burning human fat will encourage the torturer to kill again and to burn more victims to re-experience this aroma. The more the perpetrators inhaled burning human fat, the more they were compelled to commit the same act. One healer declared that the police were 'poisoned', and concluded they were 'like animals' or animalistic. The term for animals in Xhosa is *isilwanyana*. The phrase used by the healers is *babu-lwanyana(rha)*; *babu* is plural for people, and the entire term means literally 'animalish people'. Here the trope of bestialisation is associated with the torturers and not with the tortured. By treating people as prey and food, the police had bestialised themselves, and this was

both a moral and physiological condition, if such a distinction would be made by the healers, considering the perpetrators' addiction. Referring to the Christian characterisation of indigenous African belief systems, one *isangoma* described the police as 'animists', thus appropriating a white moralising discourse on primitivity and reassigning it to the police.

The concept of an addicting aroma is crucial here for many reasons. To be addicted is to crave (*ukurhaleia/ukubawa*). It can also be described as an itching (*ukurhawuzelela*). This term connotes being discomforted by an alien presence, and was often used by ANC activists when they were suspicious that an informer was in their midst. As described to me: 'It is such a level of discomfort that you have to remove that person by killing him. They feel it in the blood that an informer is around.' This deadly aroma of burnt human fat, which is either inhaled through the nostrils or absorbed through the pores of the skin, intersects the notion of *umphefumlo* or soul as akin to breath. It can imply toxification of the assailants' souls, as well as their bodies. As one healer described it to me: 'The human fat is in their blood. It has penetrated their bodies and requires cleansing. They are polluted.'

Being addicted to killing would be seen as the multiplication of the pollution. *Isinyama*, pollution or curse, is a moral concept applied to Xhosa who are sent to jail and who consequently require ritual cleansing after their release. Before they decommissioned their weapons, former resistance fighters I met with in Katlehong in Gauteng hired an *isangoma* to clean (*umgqwaliso*) the *isinyama* associated with their weaponry. Another form of *isinyama* is associated with calendrical killing sprees: if a person kills at a certain time of year and is not cleansed (*ukususa isinyama*), the Xhosa believe he will kill again in the next year during the same season, in a kind of temporal duplication or addiction that complements the notion of miasmatic space.

According to a Xhosa healer: 'This craving makes them want to smell that aroma again, they gain a pleasure from smelling human flesh.' This is a miasmatic and an empowering process all at once. According to the *isangomas*, it can be viewed as a particularly morbid form of *intelezi*, or medicine. *Intelezi* is the name for certain types of medicines used by herbalists and *isangomas*; it can also mean a specific herb. *Intelezi* is frequently administered through exposing the body to herbal steam: the medicine is simmered in water, and the person taking the *intelezi* sits over the pot on a chair covered with blankets. It is important that there is no ventilation so that steam penetrates as much of the body as possible. The patient sits there until feeling dizzy, which is the sign that the medicine has entered the body through both the pores and the nostrils. Steaming is *ukufutha*, and the process described above is referred to as 'cooking yourself' or *ukupheka*.

Ferdy Barnard, an infamous policeman who terrorised the KTC squatter camp near Cape Town and who was supposed have been allied with certain anti-ANC herbalists, was rumoured to have practised witchcraft, and was considered as having 'cooked himself' (*wazipheka*) with multiple empowering *intelezi*. This process of 'cooking' closely resembles what the healers described

as occurring in the *braai* tortures, when the odour of burning human fat penetrated the bodies of the torturers. Indeed, one *isangoma* declared that the police in the Kganakga torture had 'cooked themselves' (*bazipheka*) in the odour of human fat. Cooking is also associated with a herbal hardening of the body. It can be said that the police cooked themselves with empowering substances that intensified their propensity not only for violence but also for human atrocity.

Heat symbolism also features in the *isangomas*'s sensing of a place inhabited by *imimoya emibi*, or troubled or bad spirits, the spatial phrase being *imimoya-abantu abahambayo ye*. In the aftermath of Nelson Mandela declaring Robben Island a national memorial, a place of nation-building remembrance, a federation of *isangomas* went to Robben Island to ritually cleanse it of some of those accumulated memories. They did so after a representative of Mandela, a well-known female ANC activist, was raped in her cottage by an unidentified white male when she stayed overnight on the island as part of an inspection tour commissioned by Mandela. The only white men on the island that night were policemen. I asked one *isangoma* who performed the cleansing how she felt when she first set foot on the island where anti-colonial and anti-apartheid resisters had been incarcerated, abused and died, including eighteenth-century insurrectionary Indonesian Muslim clerics, nineteenth-century Xhosa chieftains and many of the current ANC leadership, and where this rape had just occurred. She replied:

[She] wrote us a letter telling us about the incident, we went together to clean the place to pray to ensure that this time even sangomas would gain access to the museum as in the past were not allowed, not unless one will first consult with the ancestors, for we believe that museums are not clean. When we first set our foot there to inspect the place we came back with broken hearts as we saw the place as not suitable for human beings. We felt the troubled spirits [*imimoya emibi*] in our blood. Your body tells you by 'choking'; you feel that way when you suspect someone of being a witch – or – even if a person is sick your body will tell you the type of sickness they have, it's the same when a place is sick. A heavy heartbeat and a choking weight on your chest is the first thing you feel. You can barely breathe, and the air you breathe is hot and you feel like uttering something but something is preventing you.

The notions of the sick place and of the hot choking air reappear in the healers' diagnosis of what is morally, spiritually and physiologically taking place in the *braai* tortures. A sick place of this type is embedded with its own memories, affective residues of excessive violence and negativity that have occurred there. Consequently, until they are healed, such sites exist outside of historical time. The past is endlessly replayed at these locales, and even those who come from the present, such as Mandela's representative, can be sucked into this fulcrum of temporally static pain and violence. There can be no new beginnings at such locations, no reorigination of identity and purpose, since only the violent past circulates there.

## Conclusion

Through South Africa's history of political economy, I have shown that chronic and excessive political violence can be motivated by the momentary provision of a retrospective mythography – the dependency of apartheid on the reality and spectacle of spatially and industrially disciplined and ultimately consumable black bodies. This framework allows us to see how oppressive states and para-state organisations may repeatedly use violence to materially provision and reshape the social world into momentary idealities, desired historiographic stage-sets and scenarios of nostalgic subjugation that can have no sustainable existence in the everyday world and which cannot be achieved without the use of further mirroring violence. This framework can also explain the persistent reuse of certain types of violence despite their inability to instrumentally further the stated political agenda of the perpetrators in any pragmatic fashion.

My analysis also brings the two poles of structural violence and transacted violence into greater proximity through the very tissue of historical memory that animated the *braai* violence. In the debates that have surrounded the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there has been much comment about the TRC's focus on 'exceptional', 'extreme' and 'gross' acts of human rights violations, as well as concern that the enquiry risks normalising and backgrounding the underlying structural violence of apartheid's socio-economic institutions in South Africa. From certain perspectives, the emphasis on 'gross human rights violations' is seen as an artificial separation of the political dimensions of the apartheid regime from its economic character and structural underpinnings. However, once analysed from the perspective of both the commodification of the body and critical race theory, such acts as Kganakga's torture and murder come into focus as present-day expressions of a depth archaeology. At different stages in the history of the colonial and post-colonial political economy, transacted violence and structural violence served as symbolic lubricants for each other. Severe labour discipline, as an act, a threat and a spectacle, facilitated the ideological and structural reproduction of the colonial economy. Structural nostalgia for this class and racial hierarchy haunted the re-enactments of *braai* violence as a form of historical desire, magic and fantasy that found expression in disfigurement and pain, and which rechannelled the violated and consumed black body as a renewed productive fuel for state power.

In accessing alternative memory, I was compelled to inject the absent notion of racially fetishised violence into the amnesty deliberations of the TRC, for the concept of racialised violence I employ contains embedded layers of historical and somatic meaning that were filtered out of the TRC's engagement with state violence due to its juridical-positivist approach to history. In this context, I view racism not as a form of civil rights discrimination or as a psychological pathology, but rather as the fetishisation of the body of colour in the labour objectification/coercion of colonially subjugated populations. I argue that European regimes of labour discipline in colonial and post-colonial South Africa deployed

the body of colour as an instrumental-economic substance and a magical substance. I show that in South Africa the performative signifiers of race- and class-based economic domination were eventually, in a time of hegemonic crisis, transposed into the sphere of state political ritual, thereby symbolically ordering counter-insurgency performance and consequently normalising and legitimating what has been termed 'gross' human rights violations. Hence, the cultural memory of 'white' economic dominance was mobilised as a self-conscious political vehicle that translated the residual economy of the colonial body into emerging economies of transacted political violence. This dynamic of transposition by which the so-called 'instrumental' practice of the political economy was refigured as the legitimating semiology of domination in state violence points to the magical invocation of the memory of economic domination in the material culture of political repression. I strategically deploy racialised somatic fetishism as an alternative analytic to the liberal-rationalist reductions of the TRC concerning politically motivated, and thus indemnifiable, human rights violations. I do not completely reject the norm of human rights that animated the TRC; rather, I connect the suppressed discussion of racialised violence to the equally avoided human rights norm of 'disproportionate violence' that was originally mandated, yet conveniently forgotten, by the TRC. Racialised violence and disproportionate violence form an excluded locus of a fundamental contradiction within the liberal-rationalist historiography of the TRC, and have thus become subject to structural forgetfulness by the human rights paradigm. As juridical blind spots, they are historical recesses where alternative historical memories and political experiences can be accessed.

In part, my goal in this essay has been to examine how the history of certain memory formations mediated the reproduction of certain types of excessive and racialised violence, which were given short shrift by the TRC. By treating memory as a utilitarian and unproblematic transparency largely residing in individuals or fragmented communities, or as a neutral juridical technology, the TRC ignored social memory as a normative institutionalised formation with its own political history. In doing so, the TRC ended up stressing memory's therapeutic possibilities at the expense of establishing its pathogenic connection to institutional violence and that violence's inherence in economic racism, a connection that would more explicitly relate the TRC's project with the historical evisceration of apartheid's economic and spatial violence. In neglecting the hegemonic contours of institutional memory, the TRC failed to develop a self-reflexive relationship to its own technologies of memory and failed to confront the human rights danger in not recalling the disproportionate character of so-called politically motivated institutional violence. The TRC has left an ambivalent and contradictory moral legacy to the degree that it has ceded to future generations an important archive of political terror and violence, witnessed largely from the previously unwritten perspective of black history and embodiment, and yet has failed to adequately confront the institutional procedures that reproduce and bureaucratically routinise such violence – an important prophylaxis for future democratic institution-building in South Africa.

I have triangulated racialised victim fetishism by the state apparatus – a form of state sorcery – with the human rights notion of disproportionate, surplus/excessive violence and with specific historical-economic co-ordinates of production and symbolic consumption. In effect, for the TRC, disproportionate and excessive violence functioned as a cipher or code for unnarrated, unrecognised and unwanted historical memory, perception and experience. By accessing alternative historiographies, located in labour history, local moral geographies, indigenous norms of healing, and ‘folk’ theories of sorcery and the demonic, I posed and began to answer the difficult question of how a political culture fashions power (symbolic and pragmatic) from violent techniques of production and human substances of consumption – a question any truth commission could benefit from contemplating. If not addressed, this is a question that will leave all truth commissions in a morass of symptomology and ad hoc moral condemnation that will ultimately make human rights discourse a laughing stock or a circus-like spectacle. At the same time, the salvaging of historical memory tied to excessive and officially unnarrated political violence can promote the subjecthood and agency of those communities and individuals who have been the recipients of consuming colonial and post-colonial intrusions of their person and embodiment. And is not the dignified restoration of subjecthood and personhood one of the primary goals of human rights enquiry and redress?

While excluded from the proceedings of the TRC, the respective yet related discourses on the demonic by Xhosa healers and Christianised Africans attempt to address exactly what is disproportionate in this violence through the concept of miasma, the Satanic or *isinyama*, depending on the commentators’ belief systems. In the nexus of demonic narratives, the disproportionate is always defined by its chronic character, by its predilection for duplication and by its instigation of endless dissatisfaction. It is characterised by an inability on the part of the assailant to master the surrogate victim at the very moment of the latter’s annihilation, for such is the moral lesson of the craving, toxic dependency and poisoning induced by burning human fat. Through the imagery of medicinal cooking, of *intelezi*, and the moral inversion of its healing powers, the culinary ambiance of the *braai* tortures is clarified: at the moment of cooking and consuming his victim, the perpetrator himself is cooked and consumed by the very addiction that empowers and drives his violence. It is an Africanised Hegelian symbiosis of the master and the subjugated, in which the latter becomes toxic to the former. That, too, is a certain type of social justice.

The discourse on the demonic discussed in this essay holds forth the promise of various processes of healing in the blood of Christ, if one is a Seventh-day Adventist or Zionist, or through the ritual cleansing of person, weapon and space, if one attends to the Xhosa healers. Nevertheless, the notion of what needs to be healed is determined by the concept of miasmatic contiguity and contact, and people are not the only subjects of healing – or rather, personal healing is a heavily mediated and eminently material process. The agents and actors of healing are multiple; weapons need to be cleansed, and geography previously

desecrated by chronic 'bad' death requires detoxification. Healing, here, is not a psychological, confessional process, or solely a dyadic relationship between perpetrator and victim. Further, the discourse on the demonic, whether that of the evangelical Christian or the herbal healer, does not excuse the institutional dynamics that foster the inhumane. The spatialisation of the demonic extends from the locales of *braai* torture to the corridors of the apartheid state; it is a diffusion of the miasmatic and not an individualising medicalisation and psychologisation of the guilty. Finally, the terminal power of the violent state is morally nullified in the discourse of the demonic by its emphasis on the reversibility of evil. Both Robben Island, prior to its cleansing, and the various locales where resisters were tortured and disposed off through *braaiing* and other nefarious methods constitute a continuum of enchained memory spaces. This architecture of memory is not only psychological but also structural and geographical. It constitutes a moral geography, a cartography of past national destruction, and thus is a potential archipelago of national reconstruction for a people still waiting to exhale the cooling breath of historical redemption.

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## NOTES

1. For discussion of cultural contouring of memory and historiography, see Connerton (1989), Ricoeur (1988), Koselleck (1985), Johnson (1982), White (1978) and Veyne (1976).
2. See Lyotard (1973) for the analysis of historiographic representation as an exercise in realist perspective; see also Feldman (1997, 1996) on the intersection of historical perception and the history of perception.
3. There is no truth commission per se operating in Northern Ireland, but the recently mandated commission to reinvestigate the causes of the Bloody Sunday Massacre has much of the functions and reconciliation ethics of a truth commission, although it focuses on only one event. It is hard to imagine that this type of enquiry into Northern Ireland's recent past will stop at this incident.
4. The following statement from General Magnus Malan, former minister of defence, is illustrative of the theodicy of communism that justified the scope and degree of the violence of the security forces:

Although it is difficult to appreciate the threat which communism posed to the free world, and South Africa in particular, especially after the demise of communism in Eastern Europe during 1989, for purposes of a proper analysis of the policies and actions of the South African government during the 1980s, it is necessary to take a brief look at its actual position during that time. I shall endeavour to give a short summary of the international climate as interpreted by the government of the day, and against which that government's action should be seen.

The threat was the expansion of Marxism by fomenting revolution in southern Africa. Its aim was perceived to be, first, the overthrow of the white regimes in southern Africa so that the militant Africa bloc could realise its aspirations with regard to the destruction of so-called colonialism and racialism and the establishment of Pan-Africanism. In its desire to destroy alleged racism, the Arab bloc can, with certain exceptions, be regarded as the partner of the Africa bloc in its hostile actions, as far as this serves its own purposes. Marxism's second aim was seen to be the striving after an indirect strategy in order to unleash revolutionary warfare in southern Africa and, by means of isolation, to force the Republic of South Africa to change its domestic policy in favour of Pan-Africanism.

These are not my ex post facto interpretations or perceptions. These sentiments have been repeatedly stated over the years.

5. In giving little due to the adjudication of political motivation based on anti-communism, and critiquing the TRC for failing to develop moral measures for the proportionality of human rights violations, it may be suggested I am in danger of aestheticising violence because I do not allow a significant role for instrumental rationality. In reference to torture, I have critiqued instrumental rationality as a legitimisation strategy and truth claim precisely because it elevates, sterilises, dematerialises and thus effectively aestheticises sordid acts of institutionalised dysfunctional cruelty. Marcuse and Adorno saw the technical rationality of National Socialism and its racial imaginaries as two sides of a uniform process of mythification – each strand realised in the other, in a particularly German adaptation to modernity. The mobilisation of racial or ethnic myth and phobia through rationalised institutional procedures and ideologies is, in fact, the aesthetic facade that hides and legitimises the sordidness of irrationally applied violence. I would suggest that more historical, political and cultural content can be gleaned from the form or performative infrastructure of such episodes than from the ostensible goal orientation of such interrogations – the obtaining of a confession.

Further, the predication of state violence by bureaucratic command structures, psychopathology or anti-communism does not exhaust the comprehension of chronic violence and state terror by the communities who were the recipients of these violations.

There is a surplus memory of these events that mobilises cosmologies and theodicies that have little admissibility in the TRC hearings and investigations, and which bypass institutional rationalities to directly address the issue of the disproportionate in state violence in the cultural form of the demonic.

6. *Askari* were captured members of liberation organisations who were 'turned' by the Afrikaans security forces and worked as double agents for the police and army.
7. *Truth and Reconciliation Commission Human Rights Violations Submissions – Questions and Answers*. Date: 26–28 August 1996. Name: Mpompi Melfred Dlokolo. Case: Ec/96 Uitenhage – Day 1.
8. *Truth and Reconciliation Commission Human Rights Violations Submissions – Questions and Answers*. Date: 11 November 1996. Name: T. Mvudle. Case: Krugersdorp.
9. *Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearing*. Date: 14 July 1997. Name: Jeffrey Benzien. Day 1.
10. *Truth and Reconciliation Human Rights Violations Submissions – Questions and Answer*. Date: 17 April 1996. Name: Charity Kondile. Case: Ec0021/96 – East London, Day 3.
11. All statements are taken from TRC transcripts of amnesty hearings held in Pretoria in July 1996.
12. *Pretoria Amnesty Hearings*, 15–19 July 1996, J.A. Van Eyck (0070/96); H. Gerber (0071/96) murder of Samuel Kganakga on 21 May 1991.
13. All ellipses and parenthesis are added by author.
14. Foucault (1979).
15. This was reserved by the company's slaves; private slave owners were not allowed to flog slaves. For discussion of these statistics and of slave punishment in the Cape Colony, see Shell (1994: 193, 206–11, 215–16; 265–6) on punishment of slave arsonists. For a comparative discussion of punishment of Khoisan farm labourers and Cape Colony slaves, see Newton-King (1994: 257–8). On ideologies of labour discipline and the application of violence, see Mason (1994: 48–52).
16. See Comaroff and Comaroff (1997), Keegan (1996), Van Onselen (1982), and Philip and Plaatje (1916).
17. See Gilommee (1989).
18. See Lacey (1981: 169–71).
19. See Bradford (1987: 51–3).
20. For a fuller discussion, see Kraak (1993: 37–30).
21. See Kraak (1993: 95–7).
22. For a detailed discussion of mine labour discipline and the social structure of the compound system in Southern Africa from the late nineteenth to mid twentieth century, see Van Onselen (1976: 137–57).
23. Bradford (1987: 42–3).
24. *Truth and Reconciliation Commission Human Rights Violations Submissions – Questions and Answer*. Date: 28 August 1996. Place: Alexandra. Name: Jabu James Malinga.
25. 'Coloured' usually refers to the descendants of the slave populations of the Western Cape, although it can also refer to those of mixed race and to Indians.

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