

Chapter 7: Modes of PaR knowledge and their place in the Academy.

1. Introduction: state of play

The PARIP project has directly and indirectly addressed the modes of knowledge PaR might develop. It has done this by illustrating a range of praxes (practices within which the potential to engender knowledge is imbricated) in its various symposia and conference events and through discussion of the issues at these, and related forums, regionally, nationally and internationally. The project has thus contributed specifically and generally to the evolution of PaR in the UK Academy. It has conducted specific projects and their documentation; it has fostered an environment in which PaR projects might be undertaken with increasing confidence of their recognition; and it has engaged debate within the arts community and between the arts and other academic disciplines about the place and status of creative practices as research in the context of Higher Education. The aim of this chapter is to summarise the findings, not by way of an exhaustive taxonomy but by foregrounding the key debates and selectively referencing some of the practices which have promoted them.¹

It should be acknowledged at the outset, that the account is presented in the terms of traditional academic argument which - perhaps ironically in the light of the chapter's concern with embodied knowledge - largely efface corporeal traces of the writer. A key objective is to persuade those who are sceptical about the worthiness of a place of the arts - and arts practices in particular - in the academic research domain, and to afford colleagues some reasoned retorts to the derogatory remarks occasionally received from those whose understanding of research lies in another paradigm and whose vested interests lie in preserving that paradigm. The notion is that such people might best be persuaded on their own terms. But, though my mode of expression may affect objectivity, traces of my own passions and interests in a commitment to research and knowledge-production through arts and media PaR are evident in the texture of the writing which is, of course, itself a material practice.

Some aspects of PaR, of course, sit comfortably within established knowledge paradigms. Archiving of creative practices, for example, though it has its own issues of classification, lies within a recognised domain of knowledge-production. Though the modes of dissemination and access may today be primarily digital (with the new challenges and opportunities for inter-connectedness new technologies afford), the construction of databases is a recognised dimension of library and curatorial practice. Much PaR, in contrast, not only does not sit readily within established research paradigms, it seem fundamentally to challenge them. Creative practices do not typically construct rational arguments and adduce evidence to support them. PaR is not characteristically data-based and the organic nature of creative processes means that the laying out of methodologies in advance seems to beg the question of methodical process more than it does in scientific research models. Its products are often ephemeral and means of recording them for posterity such that there might be a "permanent record" are open to a range of questions of distortion through mediation, or worse, transposition. Outcomes in the form of a theatre-piece, a choreography, a musical composition, or a film, however successful they may be as artworks, may not self-evidently articulate their research questions. The need for additional writing which might assist in bringing out the research imperatives perhaps

by offering an account of process or by locating the practice within a range of influences, conceptual and/or practical, runs the risk of diminishing the status of the product itself which some believe should stand on its own as a research outcome. Hence the relation between artwork and documentation has become a prime topic for debate.

One of the major issues to have emerged from the investigation of PaR over the past five years, then, is whether practice-based arts research can be aligned with established research paradigms or whether, for the academy fully to embrace its outcomes, requires a shift in the conception of what constitutes research, and even what constitutes knowledge. Some attempts have been made to re-present the processes of making artworks by drawing upon an analogy with laboratory science and there is indeed a substantial tradition of regarding the theatre workshop, for example, as a laboratory for experimentation.ⁱⁱ But, though the processes of trial and error of the scientific and arts laboratories may run in parallel, the findings of the one in terms of what “works” and the data-based findings of the other to prove, or otherwise, an hypothesis postulated in advance do not readily map onto each other. Alternatively, it has been mooted that the arts community needs to persuade the academy to open itself up to new paradigms which might take a different approach to understanding what constitutes “new knowledge or substantial new insights” and may even open up fresh pathways to knowledge transfer between HEI’s and the creative industries. Before proceeding to consider some of the terms on which the invitation to re-appraise knowledge paradigms might be made, it is helpful to re-visit established traditions and their appropriateness, or otherwise, to PaR.

2. Context: the Western intellectual tradition. PaR and the “problem of knowledge”

**Knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided
(Lyotard, 1979: 08-09)**

The “problem of knowledge” has been a topic for debate in the Western philosophical tradition since Plato. Though no wholly uncontested conclusions have yet been reached, a distinctive approach with characteristic criteria and canons of evidence based upon rationality and justification emerged in the seventeenth century to inform the Enlightenment academy, after ideas about the origin and nature of the universe were decoupled from myth and religion. Opinion and belief could no longer suffice where knowledge might be established on more objective grounds. It is neither possible, given the scope of this chapter, nor necessary to re-visit classical, mediaeval or rational-scientific paradigms in detail, but the persistent questions to have emerged in respect of PaR are illuminated first by locating them in key moments of the development of approaches to the “problem of knowledge”.

As part of a hierarchy in which he installed knowledge above reasoning, belief and illusion respectively, Plato located the animal drives, passions, emotions and desires in the lowest part of the soul and intellect in the highest part. Plato also opened up a divide between theory and practice. The privileging of theory might be traced back, at the beginnings of the Western tradition of thought, to the *Theaetetus* in which as Bourdieu formulates it:

‘practice’ was not helped by Plato who offered intellectuals... a justificatory discourse which, in its most extreme forms, defines action [one might say practice] as the ‘inability to contemplate’ (1990: 28).

Jumping through time, the schism between body and mind inaugurated by Plato was endorsed, though on very different terms, in the early seventeenth century by Descartes’ retreat in the “cogito” (‘I think therefore, I am) into the mind as the sole locus of certain knowledge. Some PaR projects which advance the idea of “embodied knowledge” pose a challenge, as we shall see, to the privileging of mind over body in the Western intellectual tradition in respect of the locus of knowledge. Furthermore, the project of bodily dissemination of knowledge from one community to another, for example the passing on of a movement vocabulary in the workshop from one dance or physical theatre community to another challenges the dominance, if not virtual exclusivity, of writing (or other codified symbolic language) which has long since established itself as the appropriate means of storage and distribution of knowledge. But in the production of knowledge, as philosopher, David Pears, points out, ‘practice nearly always comes first, and it is only later that people theorize about practice’ (1971:29). As he observes:

the ability to respond to circumstances in a discriminatory way must precede the ability to codify the responses, if only because the use of distinct symbols to codify them is itself an example, indeed a sophisticated example, of a discriminatory response (1971: 28-29).

So the question arises as to whether physical PaR projects might in themselves be sufficiently discriminating as to produce knowledge, and disseminate it, even if they remain embodied in the sense that their outcomes are not further articulated in another mode of cognition such as words, spoken or in writing. We shall return to this point.

Whilst Descartes’ “cogito” appears to re-affirm the denigration of embodied knowledge in the western intellectual tradition and thus appears to do a dis-service to PaR from one point of view, from another perspective Descartes’ fresh approach opens up possibilities for establishing new paradigms. Writing at a moment which marks the beginning of the modern era of Western rational-scientific tradition, a time of great intellectual ferment when emergent scientific approaches to knowledge were beginning to displace the medieval world view, Descartes breaks radically with the past in his approach to the problem of knowledge. Rather than accept the doxa of the ancients as handed down, Descartes aimed to build afresh a new world view and began by subjecting all established knowledge to sceptical argument. As Michael Williams summarises, ‘he uses sceptical argument as a filter for eliminating all dubious opinions: we are to accept only propositions that resist the most sceptical assault’ (2001: 03). Thus, although Descartes’ method is that of rational argument, his disposition to scepticism affords a precedent calling in question what has gone before. The subsequent Western tradition of philosophy, then, is not so much a body of doctrine as a distinctive tradition of rigorous questioning. The particular question which arises out of PaR, in this context, is whether anything might be called a rigorous research method which not only does not present itself in terms of rational argument but which might not even be put into words.

To consider a modern philosopher’s view on this point, Jacques Derrida, in an interview with Bernard Stiegler, relates how, having held his seminar programme in California, he awaited critical essays from the students. When two of them submitted videos instead of

writing, he was forced to reflect on the appropriateness of the mode of submission. His ‘impulse was to accept this innovation, although at the time it was not commonly allowed in this milieu’ (2002: 142). But he concluded that the video “essays” were unacceptable because, although audio-visual works are discursively constructed and quasi-linguistic (Metz, for example, writes of the “language of cinema”) and thus it might be claimed that a film or video can express an argument, merely to expose something is not to argue it.ⁱⁱⁱ Derrida appears to be acknowledging that it might be possible for an audio-visual product to count as knowledge-producing but, for him, there has to be demonstrable argument, involving such ‘rigor, differentiation, refinement which our heritage continues to associate with the classical form of discourse, and especially with written discourse’ (2002: 143). But Stiegler observes that although ‘*there does not yet exist a scholarly (if not scientific) practice of the image... this will have to come*’ (2002:143, original emphasis).^{iv}

Derrida adjudged that this particular audio-visual work submitted is, ‘*in the place of discourse*’, but it does not adequately *replace* it’ (2002:143, original emphasis) and, in this instance, seems to be aligning himself with the established criteria for an outcome assumed to be knowledge-producing in the rational-scientific tradition. He appears almost to accept the possibility that an artwork might meet these criteria but he remains sceptical as to whether the language of film is a match for verbal discourse. This example gives rise to a different question from that raised above since it does not involve a challenge to the established scientific-rational paradigm but questions whether a quasi-linguistic artwork can be sufficiently differentiated, rigorous and refined to meet the set criteria.

To proponents of PaR, it may be encouraging that Derrida perceives the possibility outlined, but discouraging that a radical philosopher adheres so tenaciously to the tenets of scientific rationalism as the sole model for knowledge and research. It remains, on these terms, a moot point as to whether the film practice of Jen-Luc Goddard, for example, which consciously dislocates established cinematic syntax, might count as knowledge-producing or whether the documentary practice of Cahal McLaughlin presented in the context of the PARIP project and involving an in-built, self-reflexive critique of the relationship between documenter and interviewee, subject and object, might constitute a “substantial new insight” into the experience of prisoners in the Maze prison’s notorious H-blocks.

To take a contemporary artist and art theorist’s view, Victor Burgin, addressing the first workshop of AVphd (an AHRC-funded PaR research training scheme) in January 2006, aligned himself with Derrida in taking as his starting-point a dictionary definition of research as a ‘scientific and scholarly investigation [yielding] facts, theories and laws’. He acknowledged that many practitioners are interested in ideas but adjudged that, typically, the artwork is ultimately independent of informing ideas. Though such an approach differentiates the domain of visual practitioners - who in Burgin’s account are trained primarily how to look - from other disciplines, it relegates it in respect of research in the scientific-rational tradition though presumably it would allow for advances within the domain which might produce substantial new insights in painting or sculpture, for example. With Derrida’s and Burgin’s positions in mind, it would perhaps be helpful briefly to re-visit the tenets of established epistemology.

Adopting Bertrand Russell's terminology, Pears delineates three varieties of the object of knowledge roughly equal in importance: 'knowledge of facts, acquaintance [things which are not facts], and knowledge how to do things' (1971: 05). To Russell the sense-data (the raw data of sight, hearing, touch and smell) are 'the most obvious and striking example of knowledge by acquaintance' (1967: 26) and, once extended by memory and introspection, contribute to self-consciousness 'the source of all our knowledge of mental things' (1967: 27).^v Thus "knowledge by acquaintance" is a specifically philosophical term and not quite the same thing as "experiential knowledge" in PaR (to be explored with phenomenology below), though closely related to it.^{vi} Thus the discussion here will focus initially upon "knowledge of facts" and "know-how".

Turning first to factual knowledge, since the inaugural linguistic turn in analytic philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century:

a piece of factual knowledge must be either a statement or something as complex as a statement. . . . [and] a piece of factual knowledge must at least be true. Truth is secured by matching one kind of thing with another kind of thing and it is plausible to call things of the first kind "symbols" and to say that things of the second kind are symbolized. Not that symbols have to be like the things that they symbolize, but at least there must be some agreed way of deciding whether they fit or not. If there were no agreed way, language and thought would be impossible (Pears, 1971: 09).

It is clear how, taking such an approach to factual knowledge, verbal language, as a highly sophisticated system of symbols, has risen to dominance in the establishing of knowledge through argument and in articulating facts, theories and laws. Hence knowledge of this kind is typically articulated in a set of testable and falsifiable propositions. On its own terms of logical validity, rational argument provides justification for assertions, bringing to bear evidence based on adequate reasons appealing to *a priori* truths (by definition agreed in advance) or through inductive reasoning *a posteriori* (inferring general truths/laws from the accumulation of particular instances empirically established by observation and experience).

Some PaR projects may locate themselves in this tradition and aim to produce factual knowledge and, where they do, they are unproblematic in the established academy. Some inquiries might follow the scientific laboratory model and write up their findings from the experiments undertaken. Indeed, where practitioners are comfortable with drawing out inferences from their processes and products and articulating them verbally in accordance with the established procedures above, they resonate with long-recognized academic practice. Such work falls under the heading of "practice-based research". But there has been considerable concern that such a move, requiring writing after the event, denigrates the "practice *as* research", or even displaces it completely.

As indicated above, PaR projects would appear to fit much more readily into the 'knowledge how to do things' than the factual knowledge-producing category. But before turning to this mode of knowledge, it is worth emphasising that in Pears' account above 'something as complex as a statement' might also establish facts. This seems to accord with the possibility envisaged by Derrida that arts practices might develop to be

discursive and approximate to rational argument. It is worth recalling also with Williams that:

[f]rom the very beginnings of Western philosophy, there has been a counter-tradition arguing that the limits of reason are much more confining than epistemological optimists like to think, that the very idea of reason is a snare and a delusion and that, even if we could get it, scientific or philosophical knowledge would not be what it is cracked up to be (2001: 05).

The modern phenomenological (and to some extent scientific) counter-tradition in which the complete separation relation between subject and object has been called into question, and the poststructuralist context in which the relationship between sign and referent has become highly problematic, are perspectives to which we will soon turn in respect of their apparent consonance with some PaR approaches.

To illustrate what it is ‘to know how to do something’, Pears uses the example of knowing how to ride a bicycle. He points out that, if it were possible to tell others how to ride a bicycle, factual knowledge might be displayed. But he accepts that the connection between knowing how to do things and factual knowledge cannot always be made. As he says:

I know how to ride a bicycle, but I cannot say how I balance because I have no method. I may know that certain muscles are involved, but that factual knowledge comes later, if at all, and it could hardly be used in instruction (26-27).

This insight seems to me importantly to afford a basis for the knowledge-creation of one significant kind of PaR, embodied practices. To know how to dance in the manner of Merce Cunningham is a matter of having trained with practitioners in that tradition. A book, such as Roger Copeland’s *Merce Cunningham : the modernizing of modern dance* (2004), though it offers “know-that”, factual knowledge of the emergence of a new dance approach, cannot afford the “know-how”, knowledge of how to dance in a Cunningham mode. The latter can only be gained through doing, and thus dissemination of that knowledge can at best only be partially undertaken in words. Even if it were possible to delineate in words (or other symbols such as Laban notation) all the muscle movements, body-shapes and dynamics involved in being a Merce Cunningham dancer, there remains an important sense in which the embodied knowledge of the practice is both prior to and distinct from, the written (symbolic) account after the event. A crucial part of the “know-how” is in the feel of the dancing, just as the feel of balance is the crux of knowing how to ride a bicycle. What might be termed “insider” practitioner perspectives have been developed in some PaR work, if only as one mode of symbolic articulation (not necessarily in words) of evidence of process but there is a case for saying such perspectives constitute a form of “know-how”, knowledge in its own right.

If knowledge in dance, physical theatre and other performance practices is like the “know-how” of riding a bicycle and incommunicable in words but disseminable through a process of workshop education (in the etymological sense of *e-ducere* “leading through” to knowledge), then PaR practices begin to meet acceptable criteria for research which approximate to scientific and scholarly investigation. The outcomes might appear

to lack permanency and the capacity for broad distribution such as is possible with the written word. But as Pears remarks, ‘it would not necessarily be discrediting if I were unable to turn my aptitude into theory. I might rely on credentials instead of reasons’ (1971: 27). And this is where peer review by experts comes into play in place of demonstrable argument in respect of facts. A judgement of a claim by a choreographer or dancer to have extended an established tradition, or even inaugurated a new dance vocabulary, would best be judged by somebody with credentials, that is somebody with a detailed knowledge of the field and a demonstrable aptitude based upon the practice of previously making such judgements.

Since “peer review” has served the academy well enough in other domains, there is no adequate reason why it should not be deployed in respect of PaR, unless practices are prejudicially refused admittance into the academy as they have been historically.^{vii} The gaining of access directly to live performance is ultimately a logistical not an epistemological problem.^{viii} Video and DVD recordings, and other documentation of practices, will be a matter for discussion below but some practitioners have advanced a sense of permanency in body memory. In challenging Phelan’s assertion that performance ‘becomes itself through disappearance’ (1993: 146), Rebecca Schneider asks whether, ‘in privileging an understanding of performance as a refusal to remain, do we ignore other ways of knowing, other modes of remembering, that might be situated precisely in the ways in which performance remains, but remains differently?’ (in Gough, ed, 2001: 101). Memory is a pre-requisite for knowledge in order to fit symbols to things in the traditional account above. More will be said below in respect of the development of concepts and practices such as “witness” and “trace” in documenting PaR since establishing how things might remain differently has been a concern of the initiative.

To pick up the trail from Derrida’s acknowledgement of the possibility that arts practices might become discursive and make arguments, some examples of PaR seem to me to test certain concepts in ways of which words are not capable. For example concepts of space and time, particularly where they involve human experience of space and time, might best be explored through that experience, through a praxis (or what Mike Pearson terms “critical spatial practice”), rather than through writing or rhetorical debate (both of which are themselves practices). But the practical explorations of space and place in projects such as Fiona Templeton’s ‘You the City’ (1998), Pearson’s *Bubbling Tom* (2001), Miller and Whalley’s ‘Motorway as Site of Performance: Space is a Practised Place’ (2003) or Lone Twin’s various durational walks (*Streets of London*, 2001 or *walk with me walk with me will somebody please walk with me*, 2002) afford an experience of time/space/place constructed to challenge these concepts. The experiences might be said to constitute a performative essay which invites an experiential re-conceptualising, and thus at least affords substantial new insights, and even new knowledge. I propose these as examples of artworks which do have discursive potential. They might be complemented in writings by the practitioners and resonate with published analytical writings such as Marc Augé’s *Non-places : introduction to the anthropology of supermodernity* (1995) or Wrights and Sights *A Mis-guide To Anywhere* (2006) but the case for such praxis (theory imbricated within practice) is not only that it effectively makes arguments but that the arguments are better made in the praxis (which might be seen as a set of symbols in the context of the discussion above) than in writing. As Lefebvre puts it in *Writings on Cities*, ‘lived space ... is felt more than thought’ (1996). Such projects run a course betwixt and between ... rational argument and embodied knowledge and in so doing explore a liminal space favoured by a number of PaR projects. The inhabiting of liminal space in

itself poses a conceptual challenge to the clear categorical boundaries of Aristotelian logic.

3. **If 'p': phenomenology, poststructuralism, performativity, and the post-classical.**

There are days when no-one should rely unduly upon his 'competence'. Strength lies in improvisation. All the decisive blows are struck left-handed (Benjamin 'One Way Street').

Thus far, knowledge has been considered largely in the context of the mainstream of the Western intellectual tradition based upon scientific reason, merely noting that, from Descartes on, the core approach has been one of rigorous scepticism about *how* we know, as much as *what* we know. Given its apparently abstract and at times abstruse debates, analytic - and particularly linguistic - philosophy may seem to be a matter for specialists, remote from the concerns of everyday life. But, particularly in respect of its sceptical impetus, this is not the case. As Williams recognises:

sceptical ideas are enormously influential in contemporary culture, which is characterized by pervasive and deeply felt misgivings about rationality, justification, and truth. Sceptical ideas, I believe, underpin such widely accepted doctrines as 'social constructivism', according to which what people believe is wholly a function of social, institutional and political influences, so that 'reason' is only the mask of power; relativism, which says that things are only 'true for' a particular person or 'culture'; and 'standpoint epistemologies', according to which social differentiation by gender, race, class or tribe gives rise to distinct 'ways of knowing', there being no possibility of justification according to common standards (2001: 10).

Addressing what he dubbed 'the vexed question of theory' at the AVphd workshop referred above, Ian Christie noted a marked disposition in PaR projects to locate practices amongst a particular range of theorists, notably French poststructuralists, and specifically Deleuze. Whilst his question about the 'appropriateness of appropriation' and his reminder that other intellectual traditions might resonate more readily with some projects are timely, his remarks identified a tendency which is worth pursuing in the light of Williams' characterisation of contemporary culture above.

It is not perhaps an accident that many PaR projects align themselves with more recent and - it must accordingly be acknowledged - fashionable thinkers. But, in a culture of relativism that affords no common standards, it might be argued that one person's authority is no more creditable than another person's fashion. Since the rise of Modernism, contemporary arts practices have themselves posed challenges to what has gone before. One reading might indeed see this disposition as an extension of an Enlightenment refusal of the authority of tradition, with metaphors of the "avant-garde" and "cutting-edge" indicating a trajectory of inevitable progress. But with its challenge to structuralism's totalising accounts of social or psychological structures determining all human endeavour (Freud's structure of the psyche; Marx's structure of economics; Saussure's structure of language), **poststructuralism's** rejection of grand narratives invites the relativism of Williams' 'standpoint epistemologies'. PaR may be a relatively

new phenomenon in the institutional context of the academy, but artists have always engaged with the cultures of their times and with emergent ideas and practices. Modern (and postmodern) artists particularly have sought to be at the forefront of cultural praxis. The disposition towards poststructuralist approaches might therefore be a contingent fact, rather than a necessary condition, of PaR over the past decade, in the sense that, as Williams notes, this body of thought has emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century and continues to inform the twenty-first century culture, but it may have profounder implications. As David George remarks:

It is only the postmodern debunking of modernist hierarchies which has enabled performance to claim its place as a legitimate field of inquiry in its own right and as a primary phenomenon enabling us now to reverse the relationship in which text is seen as prior and to hold performance as the primary ontology, and the one to be examined and theorized (1996: 19).

There is, however, another aspect of the poststructuralist turn which aligns itself with arts practices and that concerns creative play as method.

Creativity and play have long been associated, improvisation being an established mode of artistic investigation, but there is also a playfulness in much poststructuralist thought and writing which is, I suggest, attractive to arts practitioner-researchers. There is a deliberate playfulness - as well as a seriousness of purpose - in obfuscatory writing which consciously draws attention to the problematics of discourse. There is a play (in the sense of scope for movement) in Derrida's key concept of *différence/différance* (1978), and the possibility of infinite deferral suggests a free play beyond rule-governed activity.^{ix} There is a celebration of playfulness in the writing of Barthes when he pushes an idea to its limits, and sometimes even beyond (see, for example, *Mythologies*) and room for negotiation in his formulation of the 'writerly text' (1977: 155-164). Furthermore, poststructuralism fosters a sceptical and radical mode of thought which resonates with experimentation in arts practices insofar as play is a method of inquiry, aiming not to establish findings by way of data to support a demonstrable and finite answer to a research question, but to put in play elements in a bricolage which afford insights through deliberate and careful juxtaposition. The process (that of Goat Island or Forced Entertainment, for example) is rigorous in working through, and selecting, material for presentation, but it is a rigour functioning in a different conceptual framework from that of logical argument based in reason as traditionally perceived. Its aim is to discover "what works" or what invites critical insights through a dialogic engagement, rather than what is true adjudged by the criteria of scientific rationalism.

Devices of self-reflexiveness acknowledging the different rules of the poststructuralist game being played are often better performed than made in writing where deletions, bracketing off parts of words, and raised eyebrow pairs of inverted commas are more obtrusive. In performance, a vocal inflection, a gesture, a manner of looking, a mode of address might readily indicate a particular version of the perceived need in traditional philosophy not only for something to be known but for it to be known that it is known (see Pears, 1971: 04). The equivalent in contemporary performance, in a culture of scepticism about representation, relativism and multiple perspectives, is an indication that we know that we don't know and that you know that we don't know, and that you know we're not purporting to know absolutely. I am not suggesting that this is the mode

of all contemporary performance but aiming to indicate something of the complexity of its symbolic structures such as might satisfy Derrida or Burgin in terms of mobilising ideas in discourse. The aim, however, is not at rational argument, but to bring out the problematic of the relation between sign and referent and acknowledge that truth in such a context may not be demonstrable, and certain knowledge, as traditionally conceived, may be unachievable. Might this not be (or perhaps, have been) a substantial new insight more readily disseminated through performance than in philosophical writing? Though non-written means may not be required exactly to meet the benchmarks of rationality and clarity set by written discourse, they do need to establish their credentials in ways suited to academic reflection. At least within the peer review college for an arts domain authoritative judgements might be made on the rigour of process (at times simply manifest in the product) as indicated, since knowledge is not fixed but socially constructed within a specific, but changing, community.

Turning to **phenomenology**, a now century-old philosophical tradition, (established by Husserl in *Logische Untersuchungen*, 1900-1901), it is equally unsurprising that dancers and physical theatre practitioners particularly have sought to align their PaR projects with key aspects of its approaches. Given its late take-up in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s, phenomenology, like poststructuralism, has emerged as an influential conceptual framework contemporaneously with the rise of PaR. In particular, the sub-branch of “existential phenomenology” derived from Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*, 1927, particularly as taken up by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, emphasises, amongst other things, a life practice of becoming (as distinct from being), and the embodiment of thought rather than the Cartesian discrete mind.^x In some ways paralleling poststructuralism, Merleau-Ponty blurs category boundaries and emphasises slippage and “in-between-ness”. But his particular emphasis is upon incarnate perception as an “inter-twining” (‘the chiasm’, 1969) in which experience is perceived through the body and its immersion in the world. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is always incarnate, context-specific and apprehended by a subject, and thus any knowledge or understanding is achieved through an “encounter” in a subject-object inter-relationship.

A number of projects have sought to break down established relationships between performance and audience in Western traditions which keep subject and object apart and encourage treatment of the performance as the object of the gaze. Innovative PaR approaches in the domain of phenomenology aim to construct “encounters”, sometimes actively involving “experiencers” in a practical engagement, or at least denying a fixed and comfortably separated viewing position. Some projects, perhaps following Deleuze and Guattari, have aimed to construct a “haptic” space to demonstrate that a clear distinction between seeing and feeling is based upon a false opposition between two senses as experienced. Others have played with the experience of time, in Bergson's sense of *durée*, of time experienced as distinct from clock time. The functioning of memory in the process of becoming and, in Schneider's formulation of ‘remaining differently’ (in Gough, R, ed, 2001: 100) figure in other PaR projects, perhaps drawing upon muscle memory.^{xi}

All such projects might draw upon existential phenomenology for a conceptual framework and each would need to establish its specific research inquiry, but my aim here is merely to indicate the appropriateness of practical research in this domain and to insist with David George that ‘ [e]xperience is also a form of knowledge gained as first hand, knowledge gained from praxis’ (1996: 23). Moreover, the arts are not alone in forcing to a breach of

category boundaries which to some characterises postmodernism. Archaeologists such as Michael Shanks, for example, have recognised that:

the social needs to be understood as an embodied field: society is felt, enjoyed and suffered, as well as rationally thought. The statistical analysis of social science is not enough. Archaeologists, like many others in the humanities, are now attending to the phenomenological qualities of things and places, what it means to experience architectural spaces and landscape, the significance of different experiences (in Pearson and Shanks, 2001: xvi).

Critically-reflective practitioner-researchers in PaR have a major contribution to make to the broad project of the humanities conceived as being ‘to ground social reconstruction and understanding in sensorial, cultural arrays of the intellect and the senses embodied in social practice’ (Pearson and Shanks, 2001: 10). In respect of inter-relationships of space and action, site-specific performances such as those instanced above make specific interventions (see Kaye, 2000). More broadly, those PaR projects which locate themselves in phenomenological approaches have the potential to yield experiential insights into what it feels like to perform. With the addition of a dimension of qualitative audience research, the project may extend to what it feels like to a range of people experiencing a performance which, particularly in spatially dynamic events, may be different for each “experiencer”. As George notes:

The term ‘experience’ is crucial: for too long spectators have been equated with readers as decipherers of meaning... The traditional task of ‘making sense’ is then replaced by unique experiences, which are both cognitive operations and forms of emotion. The word ‘experience’ derives etymologically from the French ‘to put to the test’. Experience is an experiment (1996: 23).

In such late twentieth century approaches, action, the doing of things, has thus, contra Plato, been conceptually rejoined to thinking. Indeed, the concept of the “**performative**” has brought scholars from a range of disciplines to seek ontological insights from the performing arts. As Schechner has noted, the terms, “performative” and “performativity” have a wide range of meanings’ (2002: 110) and it is not the function of this chapter to rehearse them all, but briefly to re-visit those which mark significant openings for PaR. In respect of a clear distinction supposed at times between verbal and physical expression, it is worth recalling Austin’s seminal coinage indicating that ‘to *say* something is to *do* something’ (1962). Austin’s account of the “performative” was relatively limited to utterances which are actions, such as promises, bets and curses. Developed by others subsequently (Searle, 1969; Lyotard, 1979; Butler, 1988), however, the concept of “performativity” has come to be allied to that aspect of poststructuralism which promotes the idea that everything in culture is socially constructed, without foundation or origins. Thus - to take an example which has been highly influential in the performing arts and beyond - Judith Butler argues that gender is not essential but enacted and that:

gender reality is sustained through social performance [which] means that the very notion of an essential sex, a true or abiding masculinity or femininity, are also constituted as part of the

strategy by which the performative act of gender is concealed (1990: 528).

Thus research into performance may be insightful in unpacking the operation of cultural codes and conventions to reveal how social reality is constructed and knowledge is legitimated and circulated in the performance of everyday life. The field of performance studies (see Schechner, 2002) thus expands vastly beyond the performing arts as traditionally conceived, though the two domains are related.

Developing Lyotard's sense that contemporary culture is characterised by a technological sense of the "performative", Jon McKenzie claims that:

performance will be to the 20th and 21st centuries what discipline was to the 18th and 19th, that is an onto-historical formation of power and knowledge... Like discipline, performance produces a new subject of knowledge ... Hyphenated identities, transgendered bodies, digital avatars, the Human Genome project – these suggest that the performative subject is constructed as fragmented rather than unified, decentered rather than centered, virtual as well as actual. Similarly, performative objects are unstable rather than fixed, simulated rather than real. They do not occupy a single, "proper" place in knowledge; there is no such thing as the thing in itself (2001: 18).

It is apparent, then, that where the performing arts may have been excluded from Plato's Republic for casting mere shadows, and from the academy subsequently as concerned with practices discrete from contemplation, performance studies and performing arts today are not only deeply imbricated within the central cultural questions of the moment, but they are key to contemporary understanding of ontologies. They are linked with - and indeed there are PaR projects engaged in - virtual reality, computer games and the construction of cyborgs; in social constructions, both in the performing arts and in everyday life; in neuroscience and perception; in presence and absence, identity and its fragmentation. The multi- and inter-disciplinary academy is gradually coming to recognise a range of research projects to which performance as a mode of inquiry is intrinsic.

Where a positivist approach, taking empirical science as the only standard of rationality and claiming that no statement is worthy of credit unless it is testable against the facts of experience as systematically and objectively observed, appears to refuse most of the research approaches sketched in this section, **post-classical science** is less exclusive. . . As physicist, David Bohm, remarks:

the notion of the necessary incompleteness of our knowledge runs counter to the commonly accepted scientific tradition, which has generally taken the form of supposing that science seeks to arrive ultimately at absolute truth, or at least a steady approach to that truth, through a series of approximations. This tradition has been maintained, in spite of the fact that the actual history of science fits much better into the notion of unending possibilities for new discoveries approaching no visible limit or end (1980: 71).

Science then, for Bohm, might better be conceived as a process of modeling rather than a progressive trajectory leading to an end product of unquestionable fact. Indeed, since Heisenberg, in establishing the “uncertainty principle”, called in question indisputably accurate measurement of the world as an “objective” entity, post-classical scientists have modified their understanding of the Newtonian world model. Heisenberg’s insights a century ago changed in principle, rather than just in the vagaries of the human practice of observation, the condition that the object of the physicist’s knowledge is an independent and discrete system. Thus certainty is reduced to probability in post-classical science and the fixities of Newtonian time and space are dislodged. As Bohm sees it, for example, time is heterogeneous consisting of “many orders of sequences of moments... corresponding to material systems that travel at different speeds” (1995: 211).

Thus, although the hard sciences retain established, rigorous methods of data-gathering by empirical observation and their findings can, at best, be predictive, they function according to probabilities rather than absolute certainties. Accordingly, the apparently firm distinction between the hard knowledge allegedly produced by a positivist science and the softer insights of the humanities and the arts is itself less firm. A broader range of approaches to knowledge differently conceived is possible as with those to arts PaR noted above. Some are less capable of prior formulation and less methodical than the “methodology” of hard science might imply. Indeed, where scientific method demands repetition, performances, in George’s account:

are singular and unrepeatable events, characterized by improvisation (the word means literally ‘unforeseen’). Again theory stumbles, for it depends always on the reiterability of the phenomena it analyses: an experiment must be repeatable if it is to achieve ‘scientifically’ valid results. Performance can do that only in the broadest terms: its secrets lie elsewhere – in the unrepeatable (1996: 19).

But, as noted above, play and improvisation of various kinds can prove insightful and there can be a rigour according to principles which lie outwith the rational-scientific paradigm.

To summarize this section, it is evident that the contemporary performing arts, whilst playful and experiential are not without a seriousness which can produce substantial new insights. New knowledge may be produced about the disciplines of the performing arts themselves in terms of better understanding of their processes and products. Given performing arts’ connections with many other subject domains in multi- and interdisciplinary projects, new insights might be produced through resonances between the one and the other which transform understanding of each separately, and the two combined as, for example, in *Theatre/Archaeology* (Pearson and Shanks, 2001). In respect of the concept of “performativity”, however, performance, as variously understood takes centre stage not just in theatres but in culture and ontology, in developing new understandings of “reality” itself.

The sketch above of phenomenology, poststructuralism, performativity, and post-classical science is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the conceptual frameworks for PaR projects but to illustrate how, under new paradigms, performance has increasingly emerged in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as meaningful space

for research. The increased acknowledgement of the value of experiential “knowing through doing” has afforded recognition of how artists have gone about being rigorously creative in research. Self-reflexiveness reciprocally on the part of practitioner-researchers has established, at least analogic consonances between performance/performativity and phenomenology, poststructuralism and post-classical science. It may be that poststructuralist approaches resonate particularly with creative play in the performing arts. The free play of deconstruction, unconstrained by the lack of any original or central foundation or transcendent concept, opens up a world of playfulness in de-legitimizing seriousness. Contemporary creative artists are well-placed to illustrate the tensions between a lack of resolution and transparent representation and a need nevertheless for rigour in principles of composition beyond any inherited rules of the game.

4. Evidence

An arts practice or artwork may stand alone as evidence of a research outcome. A musical composition, a choreography, a theatre-piece, an installation or exhibition, a film or other media artefact, a performance in any field, may self-evidently illustrate a development of what has gone before in ways which offer substantial new insights in the subject domain as adjudged by those in a position to make such judgements, namely peer reviewers. Because art is inherently reflective and reflexive, PaR activity may be identical with art activity in key and necessary aspects. But, more typically perhaps, PaR is marked as distinct form art *per se* by differences of degree rather than kind in such matters as intention and context. The reflective and reflexive intent of PaR is directed within and at the academy rather than within and at the artworld itself, even though the boundary between the two domains may be increasingly blurred.

As we have seen, however, there are significant figures, even in the contemporary arts and philosophy communities which might otherwise be expected to be sympathetic to PaR, who construct research only on the established rational-scientific model with evidence expected to be articulated as an argument in words. Where non-traditional approaches are broadly admitted in a poststructuralist context, furthermore, there are those who believe that a work of art cannot take account of and articulate its own context when, if we are dealing in standpoint epistemologies, context is crucial. However an artefact may be disseminated, the context(s) of its showing may not be transferable. Thus, although an arts practice or artwork may stand alone as evidence of a research outcome, it may be helpful, particularly in an academic institutional context where much rides on judgements made about research-worthiness, for other evidence to be adduced. Practitioner knowledge is both a necessary and sufficient condition for arts practices but it is only a necessary condition for PaR since research sufficiency may lie in sustained and structured reflection to make the “tacit knowledge” explicit.

Means of documentation of ephemeral product have been addressed elsewhere in this collection. However, some research outcomes are processual, emergent that is in the processes of generation, selection, shaping and editing material in practice. These processes and insights may be documented in notebooks, sketchbooks, photographs, on video and even in related artworks and practices. Since not all performing arts or performance practices constitute research and many would make no claim so to do, a useful rule of thumb for those required to submit PaR for audit or peer review is to present such evidence as the researcher thinks might clarify the research dimension of the project. Some projects have an over-arching creative aim with one aspect only being the

focus for research. In reviewing the created product, a research auditor may be usefully led by a clew/clue towards the research focus amidst the sometimes labyrinthine complexity of an artwork. Indeed research imperatives are at times not apprehensible in a PaR practice, not because they are not in play, but because the research might take a number of directions in a complex piece. Where practitioner-researchers are working on a problem identified in a specialist sub-branch of their domain, the specificity of the investigation may be clear. But that is not always the case. Where the experience of performers is in a mode of tacit knowledge, or the perceptions of visiting “experiencers” are solicited, it may be that a simple form of documentation of them giving witness to their experience contributes to the overall insight afforded by the piece. A series of talking heads recorded on a palm-corder may be sufficient to provide evidence of a range of responses, where a more formal, social scientifically founded, audience research project would be too great an additional research burden on a PaR project.

The status of video recording as testimony is not yet fully established in law though it has been admissible in certain circumstances. Bernard Stiegler addressed this topic in his dialogue with Jacques Derrida which perhaps partly explains the latter’s reluctance to accept video essays. Stiegler notes that:


[o]ur law rests on a device for the administration of evidence and on a notion of evidence which is not the same thing as testimony but which clearly affects the notion of testimony, and which presupposes this “teletechnology” that is writing. Moreover, history as a scientific practice has a lot of trouble integrating audio-visual material. Already quite some time ago, Marc Ferro argued that the audiovisual document should be recognized as a historical source, as an archive, but this approach still meets with a lot of resistance in academia, perhaps more particularly in France (Derrida & Stiegler, 2002: 93, original emphasis).

Proceeding to make a distinction between evidence and testimony, Derrida in response asserts that, ‘it is not possible to bear witness without a discourse’ (2002: 94) because giving testimony involves a person pledging to speak the truth of their experience in public (in a court of law before the jury representing society). Though there may be a fine line between evidence which may be falsified against other objective measures, testimony or witness are pledges not to tell the “objective” truth but to say sincerely what was seen, heard or experienced. As Derrida summarizes:

A witness who comes and says, “Here’s what I saw,” will not be accused of perjury if he didn’t see things correctly or was mistaken. He will be accused of perjury if he lies, and if, in bad faith, he doesn’t say what he saw or heard.... False witness is not faulty witness (Derrida & Stiegler, 2002: 98).

Derrida also claims accordingly that ‘[t]echnics will never produce a testimony’ (2002: 94), pointing out that, in the infamous Rodney King case, the video record counted as evidence only when ‘the young man who shot the footage was asked to come himself and attest..., swearing that he was present at the scene and saw what he shot’ (2002: 94)

I have elaborated this point because, where ephemeral artwork is concerned, and where a range of people may experience it from different perspectives, the testimony or witness of “experiencers” as well as audio-visual documentation is frequently adduced as evidence. Indeed the testimony of those who witnessed an event of which there may be no other documentation at all is literally the only trace of that event. In many instances, however, it might be supported by audio-visual material - a photograph, a score, an indistinct, wide-angle video shot from the back of the performance space. Assuming such material is presented in good faith - and the protocols of formal academic submission should suffice here - both testimony and audio-visual material might constitute evidence. In the absence of falsifiability in accordance with traditional scientific method, however, it may in certain instances be helpful to cross-refer such evidence, possibly locating it in a model such as that proposed below.



The model initially borrowed the idea of triangulation of data-sets from the Social Sciences and sought to apply it in an arts and media PaR context. But since that model is strongly associated with the hard social science notion of different data sets seeking to affirm one fixed and knowable reality, it is not entirely appropriate for PaR. Thus the model has been developed into a dynamic model for process, cross-referring different sources of testimony, data and evidence in a multi-vocal approach to a dialogic process. The product sits in the centre of the triangle. In respect of process, starting at the top of the model the suggestion is that practitioners have ‘embodied within them’, enculturated by their training and experience, the “know-how” to make work. A dancer’s body, for example, is trained - literally shaped - in a specific movement tradition but, equivalently, a documentary film maker draws upon established codes and conventions of practice which may be tacitly deployed in going about the work. This corner of the triangle marks one kind of useful knowledge which, because it is embodied and tacit is not always brought forward as evidence in research. Developments and breaches of established traditions and conventions in ways of working, otherwise concealed, might be made discernible, if it were brought out.

The process of practitioner “action research” is a conscious strategy to reflect upon established practice as well as to bring out “tacit knowledge”. Documentation might be recorded in the form of a notebook or sketchbook as used by arts and media practitioners in their typical creative processes. The setting up of research aims at the outset of a project should be followed by conscious strategies to document the process. Photographs and video-audio record may serve as documentary evidence in this context, as noted above. It might include audience research in the form of reader response captured on a palm-corder after a showing, or a recording of a post-showing discussion. In short, it is in the first instance a process of making the tacit more explicit. In addition, critical reflection might be informed by the lineage of work of this kind. Nobody works in a vacuum; all creative work operates within - or reacts against - established discourses. Similarly, critical reflection is located in a conceptual framework, at minimum the baggage of education and experience which artists bring to bear in the making and critical reflection processes.

This route brings us to the third corner of the triangle which marks the broader context of conceptual frameworks. One way in which creative practice becomes innovative is by being informed by theoretical perspectives, either new in themselves, or perhaps newly explored in a given medium. Insights might be articulated in a traditional academic mode such as a critical essay which may be written by the practitioner herself or by a collaborator colleague. Though in the third corner of the triangle, the knowledge becomes overtly ‘cognitive-academic’, I want to stress that each corner of the triangle, each stage of the process of making and of research as well as the product itself, is seen as potentially knowledge-producing. If the knowledge produced in documentary film-making is seen to be ‘not extracted from a sealed reality, but tacitly formed in the encounter of the film-maker, the object of filming, the film medium and, eventually, the spectator’ (Hongisto, 2004: 03), it is not a hard, factual, content-based knowledge but a relational, processual knowledge as outlined in Section 3 above. The latter can only be fully articulated through an inter-related process dynamic, travelling, as the model indicates, in either or both directions between the angles. Though insights may indeed be evident within the product, the production of knowledge is typically processual and the relational encounters in which it is yielded might helpfully be pointed up for the purposes

of articulating research. The conditions for knowledge to occur lie in the relational encounters but the mutual illumination of one element by another is likely to be necessary to meet the “contribution to knowledge” requirement in affording a distinctive understanding that is the aggregate function of the different in-puts. The research in its totality yields new understandings through the inter-play of perspectives drawn from evidence produced in each element proposed, where one data-set might be insufficient to make the insight manifest. In sum, praxis (theory imbricated within practice) may thus better be articulated in *both* the product *and* related documentation, as indicated.

5. Discipline Distinction

It will be evident from the above that, in the emergent inter-disciplinary frameworks of today’s academies, PaR in the performing arts frequently makes links with other disciplines, themselves perhaps - as with Archaeology instanced above - re-visiting their historic conceptual frameworks and approaches in the light of developing intellectual trajectories. If, however, an academic discipline is defined in terms of a branch of knowledge which is formally taught, either at the university or equivalent institution, Drama/Theatre, Dance, Music, Visual Arts, Creative Writing, New Media and Performance Studies have emerged as disciplines, some in the latter half of the twentieth century. Thus the question arises as to whether they have specific methods of inquiry.

What links them all is their basis in creative arts practices. Though traditional approaches to the history of each domain may be an aspect of research, the distinctive feature of the study of each involves an engagement in the practice of composition and/or performance, a praxical making and doing which is not required in humanities disciplines such as the study of English Literature. Thus research involving practical inquiry, PaR, would seem to be a corollary of teaching and learning in these disciplines. Each has a different inflection, Music emphasising the sonic world, for example, and Dance focusing upon (predominantly human) movement although, in contemporary practice, they have tended to spill across boundaries to create hybrids such as dance theatre, music theatre or sonic installations. Nevertheless, each arts discipline has its own history, and the autotelic aspect of the project of Modernism sought to define, through practice and critical reflection, the definitive domain of each. However, with the recognition of the significance of performance, exploration of processes of making from within may now be a more urgent concern of arts research than an analytic categorization from without. Thus practice-based research as well as ‘practice as research’ in each subject domain has its own validity but insights into each discipline as it develops may best be afforded by practical means. Some PaR researchers seek better to understand from inside the process what is involved in making work.

PaR Knowledge and its Contribution to the Academy and to Culture Industries

Although, as the sketch above indicates, PaR is not precluded from “hard” knowledge production within the traditional rational-scientific paradigm, it is perhaps most disposed to insights of relational understandings produced through experience. PaR sits more readily, that is, within non-foundationalist and reflective epistemologies as embraced, not only by the arts, but by the natural and social sciences in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Such knowledge emerging in, and at times disseminated through, practices lends itself particularly to “knowledge transfer” between Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and the Culture Industries, the employees of which are perhaps more inclined to learn through doing than through reading academic journals. Many PaR projects are

indeed linked with specific sectors of the Culture Industries and range from developing robotics with the aid of dance practitioners, to exploring how conservation and environmental issues might be fostered through site-specific performances, to complementing neuroscientific understanding of brain functions in respect of motion and sound, and to investigating the methodological efficacy of arts practices with people with disabilities. Different outcomes, amongst the range indicated above, are better suited to different communities but all may produce and disseminate knowledge.

Arts faculties in HEIs themselves constitute a substantial sector of the Culture Industries fostering arts praxis and educating and training large numbers of people to work in the arts and media industries. The research undertaken in these faculties feeds into teaching and ultimately underpins the very substantial wealth creation of those industries. The methodologies developed through exploratory research practices both ensure innovation in the outcomes and are ultimately disseminated to keep the industries vibrant. The “know-how” is constantly reflected upon and informed and re-vitalised by more abstract conceptual frameworks drawn, as Barthes puts it, ‘from the innumerable centres of culture’ (1977: 146).

Not only has PaR yielded knowledge of many kinds in many forms over the past decade, it has contributed significantly to a shift in the language of knowledge through its emphasis on “know-how” and the relational and the experienced as distinct from the purely cognitive-objective. The arts have historically been somewhat marginalized in the academy, seen as secondary even in their place as one of the four faculties of the founding medieval universities. But “know-how”, and its practical application, should not be under-valued and “knowledge” should not be constricted to any single paradigm. A recent scientific inquiry into acupuncture involving the collaboration of scientists from several universities demonstrated by use of the most advanced brain scanning equipment that, with deep needling, the limbic system, part of the pain matrix, is deactivated.^{xii} The finding was surprising because experts had always assumed acupuncture activates the brain in some way. Though, by measuring the impact in the brain, the experiment thus produced new knowledge in the rational-scientific paradigm, it was not needed to validate the “know-how” of acupuncture practice in a two thousand-year-old Chinese tradition.

The construction of “knowledge” has shifted through history. The equation of empirical science with knowledge, for example, is historically a recent phenomenon. Growing rapidly as the empirical sciences did from the latter half of the 18th through the 19th centuries, their increasing social utility ousted what Kant termed the ‘pure knowledge’ of Philosophy (see Osborne: 2000: 3). So, ‘practical applied knowledge’ came to dominance a century ago, but, regrettably for the arts, only in the now established rational-scientific framework. However, the establishing in 2005 of an Arts and Humanities Research Council (formerly a Board) in the UK, perhaps indicates that arts research is at last gaining recognition equivalent to that in other disciplines. What is now needed, as George remarks, is ‘an attempt to identify how the elements of performance form an internal system, constructing a unique reality and providing a unique form of experience. Indeed, it is time to speak less of “practice as research” and to speak instead of arts research (a significant methodology of which just happens to be based in practices).

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Endnotes

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ⁱⁱ Chaikin, Grotowski and Meyerhold, for example, consciously conceived of their work as laboratory exploration.

ⁱⁱⁱ For a discussion of Metz's and others' semiotic/linguistic approaches to film, see Stam, Robert *et al*, eds (1992).

^{iv} The Stiegler-Derrida interview was part of a televised series and thus, in the written document, Stiegler's words are italicised to distinguish them from Derrida's.

^v Russell summarises "knowledge by acquaintance as follows: 'We have acquaintance in sensation with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense – thoughts feelings, desires etc.; we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable, though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which is aware of things or has desires towards things' (1967: 28).

^{vi} Russell makes a distinction between "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description", the latter involving 'some knowledge of truths as its source and ground' (1967: 25) where "knowledge by acquaintance" involves direct awareness 'without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths' (1967: 25).

^{vii} In the first art school, the French *Académie*, for example, theory about art and art-making was propounded but practice itself was not admitted.

^{viii} Though there are difficulties with recordings of live performance, the AVphd forum is exploring the possibility of circulating recorded image material (film/video/net art) for peer review. Theatre departments in South Africa are conducting a pilot scheme of peer review for live performance though, even in a relatively small and geographically proximate, community, there are logistic and economic challenges.

^{ix} Callois distinguishes between *paidia*, free play, and *ludus*, rule-governed "non-serious" behaviour. For a range of summary accounts of play, see Schechner, 2002: 95-101.

^x Lester Embree, editor of the *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (1997) distinguishes four tendencies in the history of phenomenology of which existential phenomenology, derived from Heidegger, is just one. See, <http://www.phenomenologycenter.org/phenom.htm>.

^{xi} Since inaugurating his own company in 1994, Felix Ruckert has developed a "dance as encounter" practice and in 2004 he initiated the annual festival, 'xplore – sinnliche extreme/extreme sinnlichkeit' (sensory extremes/extreme sensuousness) of which he has since been curator. PaR PhD projects which have engaged in "encounters" include those of Anna Fenemore (2000), Jane Munro-Beveridge (2006) and Rita Marcalo (2006).

^{xii} This experiment, involving a collaboration between the universities of Bristol, Dundee, Southampton and York was popularly disseminated in one of three BBC2 documentaries on complementary medicine in January 2006.